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Company law in South Africa has recently been subject to an extensive review 
which culminated in the passing of a new act, being the Companies Act No. 71 
of2008 (hereinafter 'the new companies Act or 'new Acf). The new Act has not 
yet come into effect but officials at the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Office remain optimistic that the new legislation will become effective before 
the end of the year. l The new Act takes South African company law away from 
its English law roots and brings it into line with international trends. Indeed the 
South Africanisation of company law was one of the stated objectives ofthe 
review process; it being held to be important that the unique characteristics of 
the South African context and especially the promotion of equity as envisaged 
under the Constitution2 be taken into account in the drafting our laws. 3 
This research paper is primarily concerned with the legislature's efforts to 
protect company creditors' interests via mechanisms designed to maintain the 
economic or capital base of a company.4 Historically this found expression in 
the capital maintenance rule but problems with this rule resulted in it being 
shelved in favour of a regime based on solvency and liquidity. The concept of 
imposing solvency and liquidity requirements on companies in certain instances 
was introduced into South African company law in amendments to the existing 
Companies ActS promUlgated in 1999.6 This resulted in the fragmented approach 
to the maintenance of an economic or capital base of a company that we 
currently face: certain areas being subject to the newly imposed solvency and 
1 There have been many media reports concerning problems with the new Act and the regulations 
thereto. For an example of such see 'Companies Act a Mess' by Ann Crotty in Business Report of 1 
February 2010. The Department of Trade and Industry acknowledged that there are matters that require 
attention prior to the commencement of the new Act and published the draft Companies Act 
Amendment Bill, 2010 on 19 July 2010. It is anticipated that Parliamentary hearing on the new bill will 
commence in September and it is therefore unlikely that the official target date of 1 October will be 
met. This despite a notice dated 21 July 2010 issued by the Companies and Intellectual Properties 
Registrations Office confIrming that the target date for commencement remains unaltered. This paper 
does not address the changes proposed in the draft Companies Act Amendment Bill, 2010. 
2 Act 108 of 1996. 
3 Department of Trade and Industry, South African company law for the 21 sl century: guidelines for 
corporate law reform GG 26493 of23 June 2004 at para 2.2.2. 
4 The term 'capital' is used here in a generic sense. 
S Companies Act No. 61 of 1973 hereinafter 'the existing Companies Act' or . existing Act". 











liquidity requirements while at the same time other provisions built around 
capital maintenance remaining in force. 
The process of company law review continued in the vein of solvency and 
liquidity and the approach adopted under the new companies Act represents a 
coherent and consistent application of this new standard. 
This discourse begins with a consideration of the purpose of company law in 
general, and then more specifically in relation to the protection of creditors' 
interests. This is dealt with in parts 2 and 3. 
Once the approach to the protection of creditors' interests has been critically 
considered, the general importance of the company remaining economically 
focused and the evolution of the capital maintenance doctrine as the legal means 
of achieving that end is investigated. Part 4 entails an examination of the capital 
maintenance rule, its origins and purpose and how this was historically 
incorporated into our law. It ends by identifying problems with capital 
maintenance rules. 
Part 5 introduces the concept of solvency and liquidity requirement as an 
answer to maintaining the economic viability of companies and addressing the 
deficiencies of the capital maintenance doctrine. It reviews the bold approach 
adopted by the United States in being the first to depart from the capital 
maintenance doctrine in the 1980's and the commonwealth jurisdictions that 
followed suit. The United Kingdom's persistence with capital maintenance is 
also discussed. 
Part 6 deals with the amendments to the existing companies Act promulgated 
in 1999 that signalled our departure from the capital maintenance doctrine and 











Part 7 moves on to examine the coming company law dispensation in relation 
to the protection of creditors' interests. The comprehensive solvency and 
liquidity approach adopted by the new companies Act is discussed and evaluated 











2 THE PURPOSE OF COMPANY LAW 
How one views the purpose of company law will depend upon how one views 
the essence and purpose of the corporate fonn. 7 Legal theory, legal doctrine and 
social policy join in a continuum that facilitates different viewpoints in the hands 
of those with predetennined policy agendas at different times. Law is a 
nonnative social practice and these tenets are the building blocks of a company 
law world view that have been rearranged by scholars and commentators over 
the course of modem history to suit the prevailing mood in society. 
Million explains that a discussion of company law is usually viewed as 
consisting of at least three dimensions.s Firstly there is the aspect of the 
company being viewed as a real and distinct entity as opposed to it being 
regarded an aggregation of members' interests. Secondly there is the need to 
distinguish between the company as an artificial creation of law on the one hand 
and a natural creation of private initiative on the other. Thirdly there is the 
debate to be had concerning whether company law is exclusively private in 
nature or whether it has a public element to it. Whether fonnally acknowledged 
or not, it is one's approach these underlying questions that ultimately detennine 
what one's view ofthe purpose of a company is and as a result how one views 
the purpose of company law. It has been said that one's view on the purpose of 
the corporate fonn amounts to nothing more than an ideological belief and that 
the purpose of corporate law may therefore be whatever you wish it to be.9 
This is no doubt true within limits and while it is enlightening to consider the 
metaphysical underpinnings of the theories of corporate personality and how 
they affect one's view of corporate law, for present purposes the discussion 
about the purpose of corporate law must be approached from a more practical 
viewpoint. 
7 The tenns company law and corporate law will be used interchangeably. 
8 Millon, D 'Theories of the corporation' (1990) 2Duke Law Journal 201 at 201. 
9 Green, CH 'The purpose of a company is .... ' Trust Matters, Trusted Advisor Associates LLC internet 
article posted on 1 March 2010. Available at http://trustedadvisor.comltrustmatters1753/The-Purpose-











Pragmatically, Mongalo states that the purpose of company law may be seen 
as making the corporate form available for primarily two purposes, the first 
being capital raising and its associated functions of corporate finance; and the 
second being to regulate those whose power stems from the use of the capital so 
raised, that is corporate governance.1O In this paper it is the latter purpose ofthe 
corporate form that we are concerned with and hence will we view the purpose 
of company law as a means of the regulation of company power. 
As a juristic person the company cannot act for itself and requires the 
intervention of natural persons. Agents of the company therefore wield the 
company's power and the company is vulnerable to such agents' actions. 
Directors and officers are the natural person agents tasked with carrying out the 
acts of the company and employing its capital. II It is well established that 
directors' duties are twofold: fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill and 
that these duties are owed to the company itself. For our purposes, we will 
concentrate on the fiduciary aspect. 
Fiduciary duties may be broken down into component duties as follows: there 
is the duty not to exceed powers, the duty to exercise powers for a proper 
purpose, the duty to exercise independent and unfettered discretion, the duty not 
to put oneself in a position where one's personal interest is at conflict with the 
companies interest, the duty to deal with the company in good faith, the duty not 
to make secret profits, the duty not to usurp corporate opportunities, the duty not 
to compete with the company and the duty not to misuse confidential 
information.12 
10 Mongalo, T Corporate law and corporate governance (2003) Van Schaik Publishers, Gauteng at 
151. 
11 The tenn directors' duties will be used to refer to both directors' and officers' duties. 











This paper is concerned with the duty of directors to the use their powers for a 
proper purpose and more specifically to exercise their powers of discretion bona 
fide in the interests of the company as a whole. Blackman et al explain that this 
test for directors' actions is subjective as to means but objective as to ends. I3 
Business judgment enters into the first part of the test but the interests of the 
company are as understood in law. In law the interests of the company have been 
held to be the interests of the general body of shareholders. 14 This has been 
criticized on the basis that as a separate legal entity the company's interests 
should not merely be interpreted to be the interests if shareholders. The fact that 
the courts have interpreted the interests of the company narrowly in this manner 
is as a result of the evolution of the modem company from deed of settlement 
companies in England in the l800s. Deed of settlement companies were viewed 
as nothing more than an aggregation of members' interests and directors were 
consequently viewed as nothing more than agents for shareholders. In 
subsequently interpreting general incorporation statutes, the courts did not give 
adequate weight to the significance of the separate legal personality of the 
company bought about by these enabling statutes and instead persevered with 
the formulation of directors' duties as previously adopted. 15 This coupled with 
the view that as an artificial entity a company can have no independent interests 
other than of those who are interested in it has resulted in the modern 
understanding that the shareholders interests are the relevant interests to be 
considered in the company context. 16 I will question the validity of this 
understanding in part 7. 
The discussion thus far may be summarized as follows: The purpose of 
company law may be viewed philosophically or pragmatically. One of the 
purposes of company law from a pragmatic viewpoint is the regulation of the 
power that directors have over the company and its assets. In order to guard their 
loyalty directors are subjected to among others fiduciary duties. It is settled in 
our law that directors owe their duties to the company itself and part of the 
13 Ibid at 8-62. 
14 Ibid at 8-67. 












content of fiduciary duties is to act in the best interest of the company as 
understood in law. Courts have up until now not recognized the company as 
having any ascertainable interests and have imputed shareholders' interests as 
the interests of the company. Shareholders' interest are traditionally measured in 
monetary terms as being the value of the company,17 often reduced to the share 
price in the case of listed companies. 
Pragmatically then, one of the purposes of company law is traditionally 
understood to be regulating the actions of directors such that they manage 
companies in a manner that maximizes the value of the company for 
shareholders. But should directors ever be required to manage companies in any 
other group's interest? 












3 THE COMPANY LAW RESPONSE TO THE PROTECTION OF CREDITORS 
INTERESTS 
3.1 The traditional approach to creditors' interests 
The traditional view is that there is no fiduciary relationship between 
directors and creditors; directors are required to use their powers 
exclusively to the benefit of shareholders and creditors must largely fend 
for themselves. 18 There is a however a line of cases that assert that 
directors may in certain instances, put aside the interests of shareholders 
in favour of the interests of creditors, these cases will be further examined 
below. The origin and significance of this trend is as a result of one ofthe 
most attractive attributes of the corporate form from a shareholder's point 
of view, that is, limited liability. 
Around the time that general incorporation statutes were being 
considered in England, during the first half of the nineteenth century, 
there was a heated debated around the issue oflimited liability. 19 While 
we know that those in favour of making the corporate form and limited 
liability readily available prevailed, there was nevertheless widespread 
concern about resultant abuses of making limited liability for 
incorporators so freely accessible. Initially the types of corporations that 
were formed had a substantial number of shareholders and undertook 
projects that entailed infrastructure development, so the argument that 
private investors would not be prepared to engage in such activities 
without the benefit oflimited liability was compelling and won the day.2o 
Whatever the intention of the legislature might have been in promulgating 
a general incorporation statute, the ambit of the statute was never limited 
to public corporations and by the dawn of the twentieth century the right 
of incorporators of private companies to limited liability had been firmly 
18 Cillers and Benade et al Corporate Law 3ed (2000) at 162. 
19 Ziegel, JS 'Creditors as corporate stakeholders: the quiet revolution - an Anglo-Canadian 
perspective' (1993) 43 University o/Toronto Law Journal 511 at 512. 
20 Ziegel, JS 'Is incorporation (with limited liability) too easily available' (1990) 31 Les Cahiers de 











entrenched and was accepted in commonwealth jurisdictions. The 
corporate veil had thus descended by this time and would not easily be 
pierced. Shareholders could now even become secured creditors oftheir 
own company. 21 
Commonwealth legislatures and the courts are not blind to the potential 
for abuse and have historically attempted to safeguards the interest of 
creditors in various ways. Companies were required to advertise the fact 
that its shareholders enjoyed limited liability by the addition of an 
appropriate suffix denoting that fact to its name; companies were 
subjected to rules concerning the raising and maintenance of share capital; 
companies were required to file certain key information such as their 
constitution and details of directors and shareholder as a matter of public 
record; and public corporations were even required to file financial 
statements. In addition to these measures, the doctrine of ultra vires was 
developed to limit a company's operations to activities furthering only 
those objects specified in its constitution; and the courts developed a duty 
of care and skill for directors.22 Apart from the detailed review of the rules 
relating to the maintenance of share capital and its related problems that is 
undertaken below, suffice it to say that in practice these measures proved 
ineffective and insufficient to protect creditors' interests. 
The only really substantial response to the protection of creditors' 
interest in South African was the inclusion of a section that deals with 
what is known as reckless trading. This takes the form of section 424 in 
the existing companies Act. This section represents an overlap of 
company law and insolvency law. It gives, among others, creditors 
standing to approach the court to seek relief and gives the court wide 
discretion to hold company directors and any other persons party to 
reckless (or fraudulent) trading personally liable for the debts of the 
21 Ziegel Supra note 19 at 514. 











company. Given the lack of an express preclusion and the use of the 
words 'or otherwise', some have suggested that the application of this 
section cannot be reasonably restricted only to situations of insolvency 
and must also therefore operate while a company is still continuing as a 
going concern.23 There is however a Supreme Court of Appeal judgment 
supporting a restrictive approach to the application of the equivalent 
section in the Close Corporation Act No. 69 of 1984, meaning that 
creditors are unable to pursue an action in terms of section 424 unless the 
company is insolvent and consequently unable to meet creditors' claims.24 
This would then appear to be the settled position. There are also contrary 
views on who a court may determine the beneficiary of the payment to be, 
however it would seem that even when an action is brought by a particular 
creditor, as the object ofthe section is not to alter the priority of creditors 
and hence favour some creditors (even the particular creditor brining the 
action), the payment must be made to the company itself for the benefit of 
all creditors,z5 
Section 424 is a burdensome provision for those found to be acting 
recklessly or fraudulently and gives the court wide powers to remedy the 
conduct complained of. While it no doubt has a sobering effect on 
directors, the utility to creditors is in practice reduced by the fact that a 
creditor is unlikely to bring an action at own expense, when the benefit to 
be had will be for all creditors. This would be true even if the section was 
applied to solvent companies. This means that proactive application to 
court, even if permitted, would not be attractive to a creditor. In practice 
the section is only invoked in a reactionary fashion by the liquidator on 
behalf of all creditors, by which time the financial position of the 
company is such that all creditors will most likely lose a substantial 
portion of their claim. Given these difficulties it is therefore worth 
23 Blackman, M et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) at 14-525 - 26. 
24 L & P Plant Hire BK en Andere v Bosch en Andere 2002 (2) SA 662 (SeA) 662. 
25 Blackman et al op cit at 14-550. This would also be the case when an action is brought by a 











exploring other means by which company law may be proactively 
employed to protect creditors' interests.26 
Apart from the reckless trading provision, the traditional lackadaisical 
response to the protection of creditors seems to stem from a belief that 
creditors do not require protection because they are able to contractually 
protect themselves. While this may be partly true for sophisticated 
voluntary creditors, such logic is wholly inappropriate to apply to all 
creditors. Even sophisticated voluntary creditors may not be able to 
adequately protect themselves owing to imperfections in the market for 
corporate credit. Armour sees such imperfections as relating to among 
others, unequal bargaining power, informational asymmetries and the fact 
that real contracts are incomplete.27 
At this point it will be useful to further understand who is included in 
the term . creditors' , and that this group is far from homogenous. 
3.2 Who are creditors and what are their interests? 
The term 'creditor' can be applied to any person to whom a company has 
a financial obligation, whosoever arising.28 That is to say that the term 
applies equally to suppliers of goods and services; bondholders, banks and 
other lending institutions (providers of both short term and long term 
finance); taxation authorities and even employees to the extent that their 
remuneration has not yet been paid. Obviously creditors have an interest 
in the company fulfilling its financial obligations toward them qua 
creditors. This is what I will refer to as the primary financial interests of 
creditors. 
26 This paper does not consider the role of business rescue provisions as a possible means of protecting 
the interests of creditors. 
27 Armour, J 'Share capital and creditor protection: efficient rules for a modern company law' (2000) 
63 Modern Law review 355 at 358. 












Beyond the immediately obvious, creditors have an interest in the 
continued financial health and well-being of a company in its capacity as 
an active participant in the economy. Suppliers certainly want their 
invoices to be settled come month end, but they also have an interest in 
the company continuing to exist into the future in order to consume 
further goods and services from them and thus contribute to their financial 
sustainability. Bondholders, banks and other lending institutions require 
the company to service and settle its debts, but beyond any immediate 
given debt, such parties also have an interest in the company continuing to 
borrow from them in the future to give them an opportunity to employ 
their working capital and ensure their sustainability. The taxation 
authorities expect the company pay to its taxes levied based upon the 
trade that it has done in any fiscal year, but the fiscus is dependent upon 
the continued trading of the company to generate further taxes to fill its 
coffers and finance the government in the future, thereby ensuring the 
sustainability of society. Employees want their salaries and wages to be 
paid timeously but equally important they have an interest in the company 
being able to continue their employment in the future so that they are able 
to sustain themselves and their families. And so it goes; thus 
demonstrating that many different groups of creditors have an interest in 
the continued financial health and well-being of a company as a financial 
building block of the economy beyond the immediate satisfaction of the 
amounts due to them. This is what I will refer to as the secondary 
financial interests of creditors. As the interests of creditors are diverse, 
they are not easily grouped or meaningfully catergorised beyond 
classification as either secured or unsecured. 29 
29 A further worthwhile distinction is between creditors who choose to become so of their own volition, 
as opposed to those who become so out of circumstance beyond their control, for example the 














Unfortunately it is only ever the primary financial interest of creditors 
that seem to be seriously considered. Let us now consider what the courts 
have had to say regarding the interests of creditors. 
The problem with Commonwealth cases concerning the protection of 
creditors' interests 
While there have been a number of Commonwealth cases that have 
touched on the duty of directors to act in the interests of creditors, the 
judgments in this regard have been inconsistent and have not 
authoritatively settled the matter. In fact since the matter has been 
subjected to scrutiny only more questions have been raised. 
The end to the passive approach to creditors' interests was signalled in 
the 1976 Australian judgment in Walker v Wimborne.30 In this case 
Mason J is famously quoted as saying that, .... directors of a company in 
discharging their duty to the company must take into account the interests 
of it shareholders and its creditors.' 31 
Judges in the Commonwealth used this seminal judgment as a licence 
to further consider the duties of directors to creditors and a host of cases 
have followed.32 The rationale for the duty is sound when the company is 
insolvent (yet certain judgments have suggested that the duty arises even 
before the company is insolvent)33 but no court has been able to define 
what insolvency in this context means.34 
30 (1976) 137 CLK 1 (H. Ct.) 
31 Keay, A 'Directors taking into account creditors' interests' (2003) 24 Company Lawyer 300 at 30L 
32 See Keay ibid and Ziegel supra (note 19) for a review of these judgements. 
33 See Keay ibid at 302 for a brief discussion on trigger points of insolvency. 
34 McKenzie-Skene, DW 'Directors' duty to creditors of a financially distressed company: a 












Therefore, although the existence of the duty of directors to creditors 
has now been well established in common law, the scope and exact nature 
of the duty remain unclear. 
The main points of contention are to whom the duty is owed, present or 
future creditors; when the duty arises given that the state of insolvency is 
a nebulous and subjective condition;35 and whether the duty is owed 
directly to creditors or indirectly as a subset of the interests ofthe 
company. There is also a problem in defining the duty given the fact that 
creditors do not constitute an homogenous group as mentioned above. 
In the United Kingdom's review of company law the Company Law 
Review Steering Group there favoured the inclusion ofa directors' duty to 
creditors in the general codification of directors' duties that was being 
undertaken. The government however rejected this approach on the 
unconvincing basis that doing so would influence directors in a manner 
that would not be conducive to the rescue culture that it was attempting to 
foster. 36 It instead opted for the vague provision contained in s 172(3) of 
the Companies Act 2006 and allowing the common law to develop 
without further statutory guidance. This approach has been criticised.37 
While the duty to creditors undoubtedly exists in common law, its 
content remains imprecise. The predominant view in South Africa seems 
to be that it is an indirect duty that stems from the duty to act in the best 
interests of the company38, that it does not exist independently of 
insolvency and only applies to existing creditors and not future creditors. 
35 Insolvency is a vague concept. See Grantham, R 'The judicial extension of directors' duties to 
creditors' 1991 Journal of Business Law I at 15 who quotes Sealy concerning the difficulty in 
attempting to formulate a duty that varies with profitability. 
36 Keay supra (note 29) at 306. 
37 McKenzie-Skene supra (note 32) at 521 and Keay op cit. 











39 This fonnulation does not materially further the interests of creditors, 
most significantly, because they do not have standing to bring an action 
directly against offending directors and as Sealy states' [a] supposed legal 
duty which is not matched with a remedy is nonsense. ,40 
3.4 The consideration of risk in the company law response to the interests 
of creditors 
Every business enterprise faces risk. Risk is an unavoidable consequence 
of being in business and it can never be completely eliminated. The 
existence of the limited liability company may be seen as means of 
facilitating such risk taking and enabling projects to be undertaken that 
would otherwise never see the light of day. In recognition of the fact that 
the assumption of risk is part and parcel of the director's role, Sealy 
makes the point that the assumption of such risk is incompatible with a 
duty of care towards creditors.41 It would seem that this fact underpins 
the reluctance on the part of the courts to impose duties in favour of 
creditors on directors and validates the United Kingdom's government 
response to the Company Law Review Steering Committee. 
It any event, it is not unreasonable to presume that by-and-large 
creditors engage with companies knowing full well what type of business 
risks those companies face and (with the exception of involuntary 
creditors) are willing to assume certain exposure to those risks. It 
therefore seems logical to focus the directors' discretion on making the 
chosen line of business successful, rather than requiring them to account 
to creditors for their actions on the basis of a trust. It would seem that it 
was with this in mind that courts began to develop the capital maintenance 
rule as a means of creditor protection. 
39 Blackman et al op cit 8-73. 
40 Sealy, LS 'Directors' "wider" responsibilities - problems conceptual, practical and procedural' 
(1987) 13 Monash University Law Review 164 at 177. 











4 THE CAPITAL MAITENANCE REGIME 
4.1 What is the capital maintenance rule? 
The capital maintenance rule is a rule governing a company's capital. 
According to the capital maintenance rule, capital may not be returned to 
shareholders, other than by way of a formal reduction of capital. The rule 
is said to be largely for the protection of creditors, in the sense that the 
capital of a company may be thOUght of as a reserve which creditors are 
entitled at all times to view as a guarantee for the satisfaction of their 
claims, before it or any portion it may be returned to shareholders in any 
way. Given the fact that companies are generally not required to generate 
or sustain any predetermined level of capital as a condition of their 
incorporation, the term maintenance has been criticised as being 
misleading, and indeed it is so. Ifthe term 'maintenance' has been 
criticised as being confusing, the term 'capital' is no less open to 
interpretation. 'Capital' is generally used in an economic sense to refer to 
the aggregate resources available to a person for the purposes of 
investment and trading. But the 'capital' in 'capital maintenance' refers to 
something far more specific and complicated to define.42 
The starting point of this instance of capital is best equated with the 
concept of share capital. Under the existing Act the first point of 
differentiation between companies is between those that have a share 
capital and those that do not.43 It stands to reason that capital maintenance 
is only of relevance to companies having a share capital. Within share 
capital there is a distinction to be made between authorised and issued 
share capital. Authorised share capital is the maximum share capital as 
stipulated in a company's founding documents that may be issued without 
having to amend such founding documents. Issued share capital is a 
subset of authorised share capital and represents the capital actually 
subscribed for and issued. Share capital is divided into shares and a share 
represents a complex of rights exercisable by the registered owner against 
42 In the United States the better tenn 'legal capital' is used to refer to this specific instance of capital. 











the company. The primary distinction to be made as regards shares are 
between those having a par value and those not having a par value, 
although there is no fundamental difference between the twO.44 A par 
value is nothing more than a nominal price indication attached to a share 
and it has no necessary relationship to the value of the share at any time. 
Conversely, a no par value share is a share without such a price indicator. 
Under a capital maintenance regime, whether or not shares have a par 
value will determine how the subscription proceeds advanced to the 
company are accounted for in the financial records of the company. 
Capital in the legal sense is the sum total of the amounts contributed by 
shareholders for their shares in the company over time and does not refer 
to any specific assets. A company's assets are its own and no person, 
either as a shareholder or as an unsecured creditor, has any equitable lien 
upon the assets of a solvent company.45 Capital here is not a res but a 
monetary quantum.46 The sentiment can be negatively stated that while 
the assets of company do not exceed its liabilities by such quantum no 
assets may be distributed to shareholders. Alternatively it can be 
positively asserted that distributions of assets may only be made to 
shareholders if the assets of the company exceed it liabilities by such 
quantum. The quantum here is determined with reference to the 
contributions made by shareholders in subscribing for their shares, and the 
type of shares being subscribed for (being of par value or no par value), 
i.e. the amount of subscribed capital. Hanks points out that the rules 
governing this capital have always played a central role in company law 
because of the significant impact that they have on the allocation of both 
economic benefit and power within the company framework.47 
44 Blackman et al op cit at 5-3. 
45 Ballantine, HW and Hills, GS 'Corporate capital and restrictions upon dividends under modern 
corporation laws' (1934-1935) 23 Californian Law Review 229 at 232. 
46 Ibid. 












While the value of a company's assets may decrease as a result of 
perfectly legitimate commercial factors and through no person's fault, in 
terms of the capital maintenance rule there has to be a positive differential 
between assets and liabilities to the extent of the subscribed capital, (even 
when the risk of insolvency is remote) before shareholders are permitted 
to receive a return, either on or of, their investment. This allows 
management the freedom to continue exercising unfettered business 
judgment in conducting the affairs of the company while at the same time 
protecting creditors from potentially devious action such as declaring 
dividends or entering into share repurchases in order to drain the company 
of the funds that would be required to settle creditors. The downside is 
that because ofthe complex regulation involved, the subscribed capital 
became viewed as a hurdle or rather an obstacle to shareholders, with the 
result that they would rather make loans to their companies than have 
their investment funds get caught in the web of onerous capital regulation. 
This has no doubt contributed to the proliferation of companies with 
nominal subscribed capital. 
While the capital maintenance rule is always said to have been for the 
protection of creditors, creditors are not the only group potentially made 
vulnerable by alterations of capital. The system of capital regulation is 
also used to det rmine the relative entitlement of shareholders to 
participate in distributions and exercise voting power, and changes to 
capital can have significant impact on the rights of shareholders. 48 This 
function of capital regulation is not dealt with in this paper in any detail. 
An increase in capital can have no potentially adverse consequences 
for creditors but shareholders may nevertheless be diluted by the issue of 
further shares, and that is why management usually have a limited 
discretion to issue new shares. A reduction of capital on the other hand 
has the potential to prejudice both creditors and shareholders alike and is 











therefore potentially more far reaching. As only formal reductions of 
capital are permitted in terms of the capital maintenance rule, it is 
necessary to consider what a formal reduction of capital is. 
A formal reduction of capital is a reduction of capital as provided for 
by statute. Legislatures have always been wary of capital reductions 
because of the impact that they can potentially have on creditors and 
shareholders alike. For this reason whether the legislature made direct 
statutory provision for a reduction of capital or empowered the courts with 
a wide discretion to condone a reduction of capital, regard would be had 
to the same factors i.e. were the creditors being protected and was the 
reduction equitable as between shareholders. Interestingly though, the 
term 'capital reduction' itself was never defined by statute.49 
The capital maintenance rule is often referred to as a common law rule 
but Blackman et al point out that this is not strictly speaking correct. 
Although the rule was inferred by the English courts in considering the 
proper interpretation of the then companies act, in truth the rule has its 
origins in the substrate of companies act itself, being implied by the 
statutory provision governing the use of a company's capital. 50 
The capital maintenance rule has been subject to much debate and has 
often been criticised as inappropriate and ineffective. It has subsequently 
fallen out of common use internationally 51 but the fact remains that it was 
one of the cornerstones of international company law for almost one 
hundred years and continues to be of application in the United Kingdom 
and Europe. It is therefore worth examining the origins of this 
controversial rule and further considering its full ambit, what it was 
49 Ibid at 5-8. 
50 Ibid at 5-105. 











intended to achieve and how it was implemented, before considering its 
faults and limitations. 
4.2 The origin (and purpose) of the capital maintenance rule 
Before the enactment of general incorporation statutes, companies were 
formed pursuant to the passing of special acts. It was a feature of this era 
that companies were funded almost exclusively by subscribed capital and 
were public in character. The concept of capital maintenance was 
inherited from this era although there is no uniform consensus regarding 
the formal acceptance of the doctrine in the United Kingdom before the 
decision in Trevor v Whitworth 52 in 1889.53 
It was with the promulgation of general incorporation statutes that 
companies began to take on a more private nature and that debt financing 
became such a pervasive feature of the corporate landscape. This in 
answer to the ever growing need for financing that that marked the 
advancement of the industrial revolution. 54 It was a feature ofthose early 
special acts of incorporation that rules regarding the company's capital be 
specified. This would typically include the maximum authorised amount 
of capital and the equisite amount of capital that had to be subscribed for 
before the incorporation would be effective. (In those days capital 
reductions would require the passing of an amendment act.) 
In the context of companies with stipulated minimum (and often 
substantial) subscribed capital, it is easy to understand the allure of 
wanting to use this capital to instil a measure of financial responsibility on 
the management on companies. The rational for establishing a view that 
this capital represents, if only on some abstract level, a trust fund 
52 (1887) 12 App Cas 409; [1886-90] All ER Rep 4650 (HL). 
53 Aiken, M and Ardem, D 'An accounting history of capital maintenance: legal precedents for 
managerial autonomy in the United Kingdom' (2005) 32 The Accounting Historians Journal 23 at 31. 











established by the incorporators for the benefit of creditors seems self 
evident and justified as a quid pro quo for the benefits oflimited liability 
afforded the incorporators by the legislature. It was in the famous 
American case of Wood v Drummer 55 in 1824, that Justice Story first 
asserted this trust fund doctrine as a means of equitably resolving a case 
that had been poorly pleaded. This principle would however become 
uncritically embraced and entrenched in the United States, being 'elevated 
to the sanctity of judicial doctrine by successive courts,56 In other words, 
what began as an act on the part of Justice Story to retrospectively prevent 
a malafide distribution by an insolvent company to its shareholders to the 
detriment of creditors became a fundamental rule of American company 
law prospectively applied to restrict distributions to shareholders 
irrespective ofthe financial health ofthe company. 
The case that is credited as being the first to formalise the capital 
maintenance rule in the United Kingdom is the case of Trevor v 
Whitworth. 57 In this case the nub of the issue to be decided by the House 
of Lords was whether a purchase by a company of its own shares 
amounted to an unlawful reduction of capital, even if it were permitted in 
terms ofthe company's memorandum and articles of association. The 
first general incorporation statute in England was the Companies Act 
1862 and it made no provision for a reduction of capital. The Act was 
subsequently amended in 186758 to make allowance for a reduction of 
capital under certain carefully worded conditions aimed at protecting the 
interests of creditors. 59 Such condition included the confirmation of the 
court and the consent of creditors or the securing of their claims.6o The 
three pronouncing lords in Trevor v Whitworth make numerous references 
to role of subscribed capital in protecting the interests of creditors. It was 
55 (C.CD. Me. 1824) Fed. Cas, No. 17944. 
56 Norton, 11 'Relationship of shareholders to corporate creditors upon dissolution: nature and 
implications of the "trust fund" doctrine of corporate assets' (1974-1975) 30 Business Law 1061 at 
1062. 
57 Supra (note 47). 
58 Companies Act 186730 & 31 Vict c 131. 
59 Ibid Lord MacNaughten at 438. 











unanimously held that as the legislature had gone to the trouble of 
carefully detailing the manner and procedure of effecting a reduction of 
capital, it could be inferred with certainty that any other manner of 
reducing capital was accordingly unlawful, even though purportedly 
authorised by the company's founding documents. While capital could be 
lost in the pursuit of the company's stated objectives, it could not be 
returned to shareholders in any manner other than under a formal 
reduction of subscribed capital. 
This meant any arrangement or agreement that in substance resulted in 
any amount that shareholders had paid for their shares being returned to 
them was illegal and therefore void, irrespective of the form that the 
arrangement was effected in. It would be for the court to decide on the 
merits of the evidence presented in each case whether a payment in 
question was in fact a return of subscribed capital.61 (See further 4.4) 
The capital maintenance rule as embodied in the early English 
decisions was unquestionably adopted into South Africa company law 
from the outset62 and was echoed in the case of Cohen v Segal. 63 The 
capital maintenance rule is said to rest upon various sub-rules,64 we will 
now consider each in tum. 
4.3 Additional rules that gave rise to a capital maintenance regime 
4.3.1 Dividends not to be paid out of capital 
61 Ibid at 5-106. 
It was understood that there was a prohibition on the payment of 
dividends out of capital even before the judgement in Trevor v 
62 Pretorius et al supra (note 36) at 12l. 
63 1970 (3) SA 702 (W) 705-706. 
64 Cassim, FHI 'The reform of company law and the capital maintenance concept' (2005) 122 SAL! 












Whitworth 65 in 1889. Lord Campbell had in 1849 in th.e case of 
Burnes v Pennell66 clearly stated that' ... divid~nds are supposed to be 
paid out of profits only ... ', and the Limited Liability Act of 1855 67 
provided for personal liability to creditors for directors who declared a 
dividend that rendered a company insolvent.68 This is in any event the 
situation that would have most likely prevailed under the application 
ofthe Statute of Elizabeth.69 The payment of dividends would not be 
expressly regulated by statute in England until 1980 but the concept 
was very much a part of English law. This specific prohibition 
followed the general understanding that capital could not be returned 
to shareholders other than in terms of a winding up or a formal 
reduction of capital. 70 The decision in Trevor v Whitworth cemented 
this understanding. 71 This was adopted in South Africa as set out 
above. 
Company prohibited from purchasing its own shares 
This prohibition stems directly from the decision in Trevor v 
Whitworth and was echoed in the South African case of Sage 
Holdings v Unisec Group Limited & others 72 and Capitex Bank v 
Qorus Holdings L mited & others. 73 The purchase by a company of 
its own shares amounts to a return of capital to shareholders and 
accordingly the company's capital is reduced, thus decreasing the 
capital fund available to creditors. Any capital reduction otherwise 
than in terms of the statutory scheme is illegal and therefore invalid 
even if the memorandum and articles expressly permits such 
purchases. The prohibition of such purchases eschews circumvention 
65 (1887) 12 App Cas 409; [1886-90] All ER Rep 46 50 (HL). 
66 2 H. L. Cas 497 (1849). 
67 18 &19 Vict. c. 133 (1855). 
68 Weiner, JL 'Theory of Anglo-American dividend law: the English cases' (1928) 28 Columbia Law 
Review 1046 at 1048. 
69 The Statute of Elizabeth 1571 was a statute passed to fonnalise the common law in England in 
relation to fraudulent conveyance to defraud creditors. See Weiner Ibid. 
70 Blackman et al op cit at 5-107. 
71 Ballantine and Hills supra (note 43) at 245. 
72 1982 (1) SA 337. 











of the capital reduction provisions and furthermore protects 
shareholders from the company trafficking in its own shares. In the 
case of Sage Holdings v Unisec Group Limited & others the court 
commented that this principle was so fundamental that it was not even 
expressly contained in legislation until after 1926 and even then 
subsidiaries were not specifically covered. An extension of this rule 
by statute in 1973 meant that a subsidiary company was also formally 
prevented from becoming a member of its holding company. This 
entrenched in statute the common law understanding that a holding 
company was not permitted to indirectly purchase its own shares. 
There were however statutory exceptions that were permitted 
without jeopardising the position of creditors or shareholders. The 
courts was empowered with a discretion to order the purchase by a 
company of its own shares in the interests of equity under the section 
252 of the existing Act; and preference shares could be redeemed out 
of profits or the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares in terms of section 
98 ofthe existing Act. 
Closely linked to the purchase by a company of its own shares, 
is the provision of financial assistance by a company for the purpose 
of enabling the lender to acquire its own shares. Although the 
provision of financial assistance for the purchase of the company's 
own shares does not necessarily impoverish the company, the 
potential for blatant abuse prompted legislatures to disallow even the 
most innocent and commercial sound applications of such an 
arrangement. It has been pointed out that the scope of this prohibition 
is wider than simply an extension of the rule that companies cannot 
reduce their capital by acquiring their own shares as it also relates to 
situations in which control could be abused.74 In South Africa this 
found expression in section 38 of the existing act, a wide and far 












reaching provision. Judge Nicholas said of section 38 in the case of 
Lewis v Oneanate (Pty) Ltd75 that '[t]he object of a provision like such 
as 38(1) is the protection of creditors of a company, who have a right 
to look to its paid-up capital as the fund out of which their debts are to 
be discharged' and relied on the authority in Trevor v Whitworth. 76 
Prohibition of issue of shares at a discount 
This prohibition was also consistent with the inability to reduce 
capital otherwise than in the approved manner. Shareholders were 
required to pay for their shares in full in order to limit their liability 
for the company's debts.77 This principle was expressed in a number 
of early English cases 78 and became part of South African company 
law from its inception. 
4.4 The return of capital: a question of substance over form 
4.4.1 The general principle 
In the case of Verner v General and Commercial Investment Trusp9 
Lindley LJ stated in 1894 that '[t]he statutes do not even expressly 
and in plain language prohibit a payment of dividend out of capital. 
But the provisions as to capital, when carefully studied, are wholly 
inconsistent with the return of capital to the shareholders, whether in 
the shape of dividends or otherwise, except, of course, an a winding 
up ... The fact is that the main condition of limited liability is that 
capital of a limited liability company shall be applied for the purposes 
for which the company is formed, and that to return the capital to the 
shareholders either in the shape of dividend or otherwise is not such a 
purpose as the Legislature intended.' [Emphasis mine.] 
75 1992 (4) SA 811 (A) 818. 
76 Supra. 
77 Blackman et al op cit at 5-109. 
78 See Blackman et al ibid for a list of cases. 













It was thus clear from early days that any action or transaction 
which in substance amounted to a return or reduction of capital to 
shareholders would not be permitted, even though such action or 
transaction was purported and technically presented as legitimate. The 
same sentiment was expressed almost one hundred years later in 
Aveling Barford v Perion Ltcf° by Hoffmann J as follows' [w ]hether 
or not a transaction is a distribution to shareholders does not depend 
upon what the parties choose to call it. The court looks at the 
substance rather than the outward appearance.' Let us now consider 
by way of examples some of the actions and transactions that courts 
have struck down as being a sham for the purpose of effecting a 
distribution to shareholders. 
Ridge Securities Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners81 
In this case a solvent company entered into a tax avoidance scheme 
that involved the issuing of a debenture to its holding company under 
which excessive interest payments were required. The court held that 
such payments were noting more than 'gifts of capital' disguised to 
look like interest and were consequently ultra vires. 
Re Halt Garage82 
Excessive directors' remuneration was to method employed in this 
case, but the courts saw through the deception. A director, who was 
also a shareholder, was paid handsomely for the holding of office 
while rendering to services to the company. It held that while 
companies were entitled to pay (even liberal) remuneration for 
services rendered this did not extend to using it as a 'cloak for making 
payments out of capital to shareholders ... ' and the situation was 
80 [1989] 5 B.C.C 677. 
81 [1964] 1 W.L.R. 479. 











likened to the case of Ridge Securities Ltd v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners. 
4.4.4 Aveling Barford v Perion Lttf3 
In this case a company having no distributable reserves sold an asset 
to another company controlled by the same beneficial shareholder for 
a sum of GBP350,OOO, which the second company was able to sell for 
GBPl,500,OOO within a six month period. The courts held that 
although the transaction was in law a sale, ' ... [t]he false dressing it 
wore was that of a sale at arms' length or at market value. It was the 
fact that it was known and intended to be a sale at an undervalue that 
made it an unlawful distribution'. 
4.4.5 Redweaver Investments Ltd v Lawrenc  Field Lttf4 
83 Supra. 
In this case a subscription agreement contained a clause that should 
the subscriber fail to realise certain expected monetary benefits from 
the issuing company within a specified time frame, the company 
would be liable to make a payment in respect of' damages' to the 
subscriber by way of compensation. When the expected benefits 
failed to materialise, the subscriber sought to enforce the payment of 
the contractual damages amount. The court held that the arrangement 
was' ... quite artificial; the reference to damages and to liquidated 
damages is no more than nominal, and the true and obvious subject is 
machinery for the plaintiff to get back the subscription moneys ... '. 
Accordingly it found that agreeing to make such a payment was 
illegal and the purported contractual obligation was therefore not 
enforceable. 











4.4.6 Rosslare (Pty) Ltd and Another v Registrar o/Companieis 
This case was considered prior to the promulgation of the Sectional 
Titles Act86 and involved an overzealous attempt by the Registrar of 
Companies to prevent a share block company from altering its articles 
of association after the fashion of the time. Why the Registrar took 
exception in this particular case after registering many such similar 
amendments is not clear. The court distinguished this case from the 
decision is the similar case of Jenkins v Harbour View Courts Ltcf7 
and held that the granting of an interest in immovable property to a 
member (i.e. the distribution of an asset) of a value equivalent to the 
capital subscribed was not a return of capital, because the purchase of 
the immoveable property had been funded by means of shareholders 
loans and not share capital. 
This then is how the courts have viewed disguised returns of capital. 
Let us now examine the regulatory framework pursuant to the 
implementation of the capital maintenance regime, before the enactment 
of the Companies Amendment Act No. 37 of 1999 (hereinafter -the 
amendment Act'). 
4.5 The legislative framework in South Africa pre-1999 underpinning the 
capital maintenance regime 
Chapter V of the existing Act is entitled Share Capital and contains the 
complex web of regulation surrounding capital. Section 74 makes 
allowances for the division of share capital into both par value and no par 
value shares, although all the shares of a particular class, being either 
ordinary or preference shares, are to be either of par value or of no par 
value. 88 Section 75 dealt with alterations of share capital. 
85 [1972] 2 All SA 354 (D). 
86 Act No. 66 of 1971. 
87 [1966] NZLR 1. 











, , Sections 76 to 82 contain the onerous provisions regarding the way that 
the proceeds on the issue of different types are to be accounted for, that is 
the structure of a company's capital accounts and the restrictions as to the 
application of those accounts. 
Sections 83 to 90 of the existing companies Act contained the 
provisions governing the formal reduction of capital before the 
promulgation of the amendment Act. These rules were aimed at ensuring 
that the interest of creditors and shareholders were protected when capital 
was reduced. Creditors' concerns in this situation centre around the 
diminution of the capital fund and its potential effect on settlement of 
their claims, while shareholders interests would be affected by the 
alternation of their rights incumbent upon a capital reduction. Blackman et 
al point out that in strict terms these rules did not form part of the capital 
maintenance rule but rather served as a justification of the capital 
maintenance rule. The fact that that these provision so carefully and 
comprehensively dealt with capital reductions inevitably and naturally 
lead one to the conclusion that they dealt with capital reductions 
exhaustively, and that by implication no other means of capital reductions 
could be countenanced. 89 
Sections 38 and 98 also had a role to play in capital maintenance, 
dealing with financial assistance for the purchase of a company's shares 
and redeemable preference shares respectively. 
Section 83 was an innovation when into was promulgated in 1973. It 
permitted a company to reduce its share capital by special resolution and 
without the confirmation of the court provided that the company either 
had no creditors or had the consent of all creditors; and that all classes of 











shares were affected in equal proportion.9o Sections 84 to 86 contained the 
standard provisions granting a company to reduce capital with the 
permission of the court. 
4.6 The problems with the capital maintenance regime 
Statements that the function of the capital maintenance regime is to serve 
as a protection mechanism for creditors' interests feature prominently in 
all judgments concerning capital maintenance.91 
While the theoretical basis upon which the capital maintenance regime 
rests is sound i.e. that creditors' interests are deserving of the protection of 
company law as a quid pro quo for the limited liability enjoyed by 
shareholders92, in practice the capital maintenance regime does not 
achieve what so many courts have insisted it does and is practically of 
little or no comfort to creditors. 
Many have pointed out that creditors are instinctively aware of the 
short comings of the capital maintenance regime as a form of creditor 
protection and as a consequence place no reliance upon it. This raises the 
question of whether the costs of adhering to a capital maintenance regime 
are justified given that the intended beneficiaries of the system place little 
or no value on the end product. The costs involved are both direct and 
indirect in nature. Direct costs include the princely sums payable to 
accounting and legal experts that necessarily accompany any capital 
restructuring or distribution; and indirect costs include the burden of 
inefficiencies and of having the judiciary enforce an overly-complex set of 
rules. In fact the inefficiency of the capital maintenance regime has been 
90 Blackman et al op cit 5-10. 
91 To name but a few: Trevor v Whitworth; Guinness v Land Corporation ofIreland (1882) 22 Ch D 
349 CA; Verner v General and Commercial Investment Trust; Ammonia Soda Co Ltd V Chamberlain 
[1918] 1 Ch 266 CA; Ooregum Gold Mining Company of India v Roper; Cohen v Segal. 











the object of much criticism. Such criticisms ranges from the stifling 
effect that it has on dividend declaration and hence how it hampers the 
communication of important information via market mechanisms, to the 
fact that more efficient means of creditor protection exist, such as 
voluntary creditors contractually: demanding higher interest rates to 
compensate for increased levels of risk, imposing restrictions on 
distributions, requiring the maintenance of pre- determined financial ratios 
or requiring the provision of personal guarantees or suretyships. Cassim 
concedes the inefficiency of the capital maintenance regime but for him 
the rules remain justifiable to the extent that they counter opportunistic 
shareholder behaviour and excessive distributions.93 Even so he 
recognises that 'capital maintenance rules are unnecessarily complex and 
riddled with obscurities, but worse still, many ofthese rules have outlived 
their usefulness. ,94 
I have already alluded to the fact that the term capital maintenance is 
an inaccurate expression of what the rule actually achieves. There is no 
maintenance in the sense that if the value of the assets represented by the 
capital contributed is diminished in the course to business there is no 
requirement whatsoever that such loss should be made good. Staying with 
Cassim, he rightly a serts that '[t]he classical capital maintenance concept 
has got nothing to do with ensuring that a company has adequate capital to 
meet the claims of creditors. All that this concept attempts to do is to 
endure that the issued share capital of a company - whatever this amount 
may be - is maintained in the sense that the company does not return its 
issued share capital to its shareholders except where this is authorised by 
the Companies Act. ,95 
The general absence of minimum capital requirements is also a 
significant shortfall. Even where there are legislated initial minimum 
93 Cassim supra (note 62) at 284. 
94 Ibid. 











capital requirements, such as in the European Union, these do not take 
into account the size and scope of the particular company's business nor 
the inherent risk in the nature of its operations. A one-size-fits-all 
approach is simply not tenable. Enriques and Macey further note that the 
implementation of the extreme "recapitalise or liquidate rule' in certain 
European Union Member States, while more robust in its approach to 
protecting creditors, in fact runs counter to the very essence of limited 
liability and affords opportunistic shareholders increased scope for 
skulduggery and manipulation i.e. effective regulatory arbitrage. 
A contention that the capital maintenance regime provides some form 
of financial accounting yardstick facilitating the protection of creditors 
can be countered on many fronts. Firstly, accounting data is historic in 
nature and a corporate balance sheet has no necessary link with market 
values and economic reality. What is more, there are inherent limitations 
in financial accounting such as not being able to reflect the inherent value 
of goodwill on a company's balance sheet or human resources as an asset, 
both of which factors playa major role in the economic sustainability of a 
company. Secondly, accounting has developed (if indeed it can be called 
development, some may be tempted to say devolved) to the point at which 
it has become a simulacrum, operating in a "'hyperreality" of self-
referencing models' .96 In other words financial accounting has become an 
arbitrary exercise, practically leaving management much discretion in 
determining amongst other things, distributable profits. Thirdly, the 
community of 'independent' accounting and auditing specialists that is 
required to enforce the desired protection, in addition to having a myriad 
of valuation techniques at their disposal capable of justifying a wide range 
of outcomes, can never act truly independently in an expert role, being 
inherently conflicted by the economic reality of having to generate new 
and repeat business for themselves.97 Fourthly, equity capital is no longer 
96 Macintosh, NB et al "Accounting as simulacrum and hyperreality: perspectives on income and 
capital' (2000) 25 Accounting, Organisations and Society 13. 
97 Enriques, L and Macey, JR 'Creditors versus capital formation: the case against the European legal 











the predominant method of financing companies that it was when the 
capital maintenance concept was birthed. The increased dependency on 
debt means that there is all too often only nominal capital to maintain in 
any event. 
Fundamentally, many these of these problems exist because the entire 
rationale for the legal capital scheme is based upon a simplistic and static 
model of nature of business and creditors' interests.98 With all these 
reservations about the capital maintenance regime it was only a matter of 
time until alternative means of creditor protection was sought. 











5 THE INTERNATIONAL TREND AWAY FROM THE CAPITAL 
MAITENANCE REGIME 
5.1 Solvency and liquidity requirements 
5.1.1 What are solvency and liquidity requirements? 
99 Ibid at 14. 
If creditors are in practice more concerned with the economic viability 
of a company than its capital structure and capital accounts, it raises 
the question of how best to protect this economic viability whilst 
maintaining a balance between the conflicting interests of 
shareholders and creditors when it comes to matter concerning 
distributions of any sort to shareholders.99 Shareholders cannot be 
expected to wait until all creditors claims are settled in full before 
being permitted to share in the wealth created by the company. 
Indeed, given the secondary financial interests of creditors that I 
highlighted in part 3.2 above, such a modus operandi would 
necessitate, in essence, a partial liquidation or realisation of a 
company's trading position each time shareholders wished to extract 
value from the company, and would in fact run counter to the broader 
interests of creditors. Provided distributions are carried out in a 
responsible manner such that the economic viability of the company 
in not compromised by the distribution itself and further provided that 
their claims are regularly serviced, creditors should not in principle 
have any objection to shareholders receiving value from the company 
in the form of such distributions, even while their claims remain 
outstanding. It is contended that this is what the capital maintenance 
doctrine has tried to achieve all along. However, its methodology and 
implementation proved to be ineffective, overly complex and too 
restrictive for shareholders. tOO And this is where solvency and 
liquidity requirements enter into the picture. 
100 The use oflegal capital as a system to achieve equity between shareholders inter se is beyond the 











Solvency and liquidity are two important legs of economic 
sustainability. In simple tenns, solvency is generally defined as a 
situation in which the value of a company's assets exceed it liabilities, 
(where such liabilities mayor may not include the right of preference 
shareholders to dividend payments). Liquidity generally describes the 
ability of the company to meets it debts during a foreseeable time 
period, often expressed as twelve months. It has been argued that 
creditors are primarily, and more specifically, concerned only with the 
ability of the company to meet its obligations as they fall due i.e. the 
solvency test and not so much with the valuation of companies' assets 
as they appear on the balance sheet101 , but consideration ofthis point 
is beyond the scope of this paper and further analysis of this 
contention will not be entertained here. 
The premise of solvency and liquidity requirements rests upon 
the company being able to meet both such tests post any distribution, 
with potential for personal liability arising for directors who authorise 
any distribution in contravention. This eases creditors' minds given 
that directors are appointed by, and most likely to act in accordance 
with the wishes, of shareholders (at least if they wish to retain their 
position). Personal liability is the threatened sanction used to 
concentrate directors' minds and mitigate the fact that - as Manning so 
eloquently puts it - hungry goats have been set to watch the 
cabbages. 102 
It is ironic that the use of solvency and liquidity requirements 
first found favour in the United States, because the seed had been 
planted in England almost four hundred year earlier. While on the one 
hand the use of solvency and liquidity measures to safeguard the 
interests of creditors may be seen as a new development, on the other 
lOl Hanks supra (note 45) at 148. 











it can be argued that solvency and liquidity requirements are nothing 
more than a pragmatic way of achieving the protection offered 
creditors under the application ofthe Statute of Elizabeth of 1571. 
Nevertheless let us further examine the modern evolution of solvency 
and liquidity requirements in the United States and internationally 
over the past thirty years. 
5.2 The USA leads the way 
There is a philosophical divide between the approaches to creditor 
protection in the United States and the United Kingdom. 103 While the 
United Kingdom adopts a paternalistic stance, wanting to proactively 
shield creditors, in the United States creditors are largely expected to fend 
for themselves via contractual arrangements. In the United States it was 
thus decided that employing safeguards built around solvency and 
liquidity, rather than a restrictive legal capital regime, was a more 
efficient and palatable method of affording creditors some measure of 
protection. 
Bayless Manning was one of the foremost critics of the system of legal 
capital in the United States. In his definitive work Legal Capitall04 he 
asserted that the entire legal capital scheme is based upon a static and 
skewed model of creditors' interests that values the assets contributed by 
the shareholders of the company over time, above more pragmatic and 
real concerns such as cash flow considerations. He goes on to bemoan the 
fact that this theoretical construct is solely a legal invention that grew out 
of nineteenth century jurisprudence and ' ... is not relatable in any way to 
the ongoing economic conditions ofthe enterprise.' 105 Manning's work 
was first published in 1977 and in the preface to that first edition he aired 
a suspicion that, despite its short comings, the then exiting system of legal 
103 Since its entry into the European Union and the 2nd Company Law Directive, the United Kingdom is 
also reflective of the stance of the European Union. 
104 Manning op cit at 18 - 22. 











capital would prove durable. He was however to be pleasantly surprised. 
In 1980, after an extensive study, the American Bar Association's 
Committee on Corporate Laws revised the Model Business Corporations 
Act, a statute drafted and maintained by some of the America's best legal 
minds and which serves as the basic incorporation statute of most states', 
in a revolutionary manner inconsistent with the incumbent legal capital 
regime. Subsequent further revisions in 1984 and 1987 saw the legal 
capital doctrine removed altogether. There were no longer any capital 
accounts and hence the concept of a capital reduction could not even arise. 
All shares were to be of no par value and all distributions i.e. dividends, 
redemptions, repurchase or otherwise, were subject only to liquidity and 
solvency tests. Preference shareholders rights are protected by adding the 
amount to which they have preferent right to liabilities under the solvency 
test. \06 This remains the case in most jurisdictions in the United States 
today.107 It should be noted that the terminology employed in the United 
States is slightly different. While the solvency test as we know it retains 
its name, in some circles it is alternatively referred to as the balance sheet 
solvency test or just the balance sheet test; and the liquidity test as we 
know it is referred to as the equity insolvency test, the equity solvency test 
or simply the equity test. 
5.3 Commonwealth jurisdictions follow 
Let us now briefly consider the international trend among Commonwealth 
countries. 
While the capital maintenance principle continues to apply in Canada 
i.e. legal capital may only be reduced as specifically provided for by 
statute, the Canadian Business Corporations Act 1985 relaxed the 
requirements for such formal reductions of capital. Dividends may still 
not be paid out of capital. Only no par value shares are permitted and the 
106 Blackman et al op cit at 5-115. 











company still has a system of stated capital accounts but the procedure for 
a reduction of capital no longer requires creditors consent and 
confirmation by the court. Instead compliance with solvency and liquidity 
requirements are substituted for creditor and court permission. 108 Australia 
adopted a similar approach from 1998.109 These approaches represent a 
middle-road between the historical capital maintenance regime and its 
renunciation in favour of solvency and liquidity requirements. 
New Zealand adopted a new companies act in 1994110 that closely 
follows the American Model Business Corporation Act in principle. III 
Prior to this New Zealand followed the capital maintenance doctrine but 
in addition had common law that required compliance with solvency and 
liquidity requirement for distributions to shareholders. 112 The capital 
maintenance doctrine is now completely abolished as is the use of the 
legal capital system to regulate shareholder relationships - a company 
need not even have share capital as a prerequisite for incorporation. In its 
place are solvency and liquidity requirements for all distributions to 
shareholders thus protecting creditors; and a flexible system consisting of 
pre-emptive rights and a positive duty on directors to consider the fairness 
of company share transaction with shareholder thus addressing existing 
shareholder vulnerability. 
This then is how selected common wealth countries chose to embrace 
the movement started by the United States, but how has the United 
Kingdom, the home of capital maintenance, responded to these 
international developments. 
108 Blackman et al op cit at 5-113. 
109 Ibid at 5-114. 
110 Companies Act No 105 of 1993. 
III Blackman et al op cit at 5-111. 
112 Van Der Linde, K . Aspects of the regulation of share capital and distributions to shareholders' 











5.4 The United Kingdom persists with capital maintenance 
The United Kingdom is part ofthe European Union and as such has given 
up a certain amount of autonomy over deciding it own path when it comes 
to among other things, corporate law making. Over the past decades the 
European Union has been on a quest to harmonise the corporate law of 
member states to ensure an acceptable level of homogeneity, thus limiting 
unhealthy competition and the possibility for regulatory arbitrage between 
member states. This has been achieved through the issuance of directives 
binding upon member states. The directive relevant to the current 
discussion is the Second Company Law Directive of 1976113 that requires 
public companies maintain their legal capital. It is interesting to note that 
the capital maintenance regime that prevails in the European Union is not 
the work of union law makers. Rather it was inherited largely from 
individual member states' (most German) legislationl14 and has 
subsequently become entrenched in European legal culture. Because the 
Second Directive is only applicable to public companies, the possibility 
exists for individual member states to introduce different legislation (such 
as would include solvency and liquidity requirements) governing private 
companies, but the wisdom in introducing radically different regulatory 
scheme within the same jurisdiction has been questioned. There is also 
nothing preventing member states from adopting solvency and liquidity 
requirements in addition to the capital maintenance regime, although this 
comes with the caveat of over-regulation. 
The European Union has taken note of the international trend away 
from capital maintenance and toward solvency and liquidity and even 
went so far as to commission a leading accounting firm to undertake a 
comprehensive study ofthe alternatives to the approach adopted under the 
Second Directive, with a view to remaining internationally competitive. 
Those with a jaundiced eye may say that given the accounting (and legal) 
113 Directive 77/9l/EEC hereinafter the . Second Directive'. 
114 Kuhner, C 'The future of creditor protection through capital maintenance rules in European law' 











professions' vested interest in maintaining a legal capital system because 
of all the professional fees that result as an unavoidable consequence, it is 
hardly surprising that the report by KPMG published in 2008 concluded 
that' ... the Second Directive is a flexible instrument, that compliance costs 
are limited, and that it does not cause significant operational problems for 
companies ... ' .1\5 On the basis of the report the commission decided not to 
pursue any substantive amendments to the Second Directive. 
It is in this context that the United Kingdom conducted its extensive 
process of corporate law reform that culminated in the strengthening of its 
capital maintenance regime in the Companies Act 2006. Under the 
Companies Act 2006 public companies are required to ensure that the 
value of it net assets do not fall below the level of its legal capital and a 
minimum legal capital of GBP50,000 applies. I 16 Dividends may only be 
paid out of profits determined in accordance with rules that require 
accumulated realised losses to be netted off against accumulated realised 
profits in calculating such profits; and capital reduction are only permitted 
with the familiar requirements of creditor and court consent. Repurchases 
and redemptions are treated in the same fashion only being permissible if 
funded out of profits or the proceeds of a fresh issue, with the creation of 
a capital reserve redemption fund being required where profits are 
utilised. 117 Non-distributable reserves are thus the order the day for 
public companies. 
In respect of private companies the United Kingdom has made a 
concession in allowing repurchases and redemptions to be fund out of 
capital subject to solvency and liquidity requirements. Ferran points out 
115 Ferran, E Principles of Corporate Finance Law (2008) at 180. 
116 The Second Directive only requires EUR25,000 by way of comparison. 
117 Blackman et al op cit at 5-110. Although Blackman is referring to the Companies Act 1985, very 
little other than the abolition of the concept of authorised share capital has changed in relation to capital 












that the different approaches to creditor protection for public versus 
private companies is oddly inconsistent and peculiar. I 18 
5.5 The drawback of solvency and liquidity requirements 
Solvency and liquidity requirements have not been around long enough to 
conclusively determine which system is superior and only competition 
between the two systems over time can ultimately be the judge. One 
should not under estimate the longevity of the legal capital system. I 19 
Every system has its limitations and it would be remiss not to consider, 
even if very briefly, the counter arguments to solvency and liquidity 
requirements as a wholesale replacement for the capital maintenance 
system. 120 
Because solvency and liquidity requirem nts are essentially based 
upon a determination by the directors of the ability of the company to pay 
its debts in the future, and because it is not reasonable to expect directors 
to assume responsibility for the affairs of a company far into the future 
when they may no longer even serve as a director, the time horizon that 
can practically be used for such purpose is limited and usually regarded as 
about one year from either the decision to make a distribution or the actual 
payment thereof. This means that solvency and liquidity requirements 
have an inherent short-term bias and that long-term creditors are therefore 
prejudiced as a matter of course. It is not clear how such long-term 
interests should be catered for and this has been a major reservation 
among those resisting change. Another criticism is that a breach of 
solvency and liquidity requirements can only ever be detected after the 
distribution and that as a result the system is reactive rather than 
preventative in nature. Although it may well be argued that 'flexible ex 
118 Ferran supra at 183. 
119 Khuner supra (note 113) at 364. 











post standards are inherently preferable to rigid ex ante standards' these 
present the more credible criticisms. 
Other criticisms of the system, as a replacement in Europe, include the 
fact that because the legal capital regime is so deeply entrenched, to 
change the system would cause great confusion and incur substantial 
adaptation costs and that liability rules for management would need to be 











6 SOUTH AFRICA ABOLISHES THE CAPITAL MAINTENANCE REGIME IN 
FAVOUR OF SOLVENCY AND LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS 
6.1 Amendment Act No. 37 of 1999 
South African company law had, true to its English law heritage, followed 
the capital maintenance principle. This all changed with the amendment of 
the existing Act in 1999. Sections 83 to 90 of the original 1973 Act were 
repealed and substituted by sections 8-14 of the amendment Act. The 
rules contained in the repealed sections provided the means of a formal 
reduction of capital and required a special resolution and the standard 
creditor and court consent. Jooste makes the points that without these 
enabling sections a company now no longer has a general power to reduce 
its share capital other than by way of buy backs. 121 Although these rules 
were not in themselves the capital maintenance doctrine, they provided 
the justification for the doctrine as further discussed in part 4.1 above. 
Jooste's argument that to allow reductions of capital at will would 
completely disregard the other important function of capital maintenance 
(other than the protection of creditors interests' that is) being a means of 
regulating shareholder power and entitlements, and that it could never 
have been the intention of the legislature to disregard shareholder rights., 
. . 
IS very persuasIve. 
The new sections 85- 89 deal with the acquisition by a company of its 
own shares i.e. buybacks, the required procedure and some of the 
consequences thereof. Section 85 put an end to the common law general 
prohibition of a company purchasing it own shares. It provides that a 
company may by special resolution and if authorised by its articles 
acquire it own shares subject to liquidity and solvency test contained in 
the section 85(4) under either a specific or general authority. It requires 
the share so acquired are cancelled and returned to the status of authorised 
and unissued thereby ruling out the possibility of treasury shares. 













Section 86 deal with liability attaching for offending payments. 
Section86(1) makes provision for joint and several personal liability on 
the part of directors who permit a company to acquire its own sharers in 
contravention of the solvency and liquidity requirements of section 85(4). 
The liability is to the extent of any amount paid by the company for such 
shares not otherwise recovered, subject to any relief granted under section 
248. Section 86 (3) makes allowance for a creditor who is prejudiced by a 
payment in contravention of section 85(4) to apply to court for an order in 
equity, and grants the court a wide discretion to, among other things, order 
the shareholder recipients of payments to return them the company. 
Section 87 deals with the procedure to be followed by the company 
when making an offer to acquire its own shares. It requires an offering 
circular containing certain specific information to be delivered to 
shareholders and applies the same stringent liability rules applicable to the 
issue of a prospectus to such offering circular. Shareholders of the same 
class are to enjoy equal treatment. 
Section 88 makes it clear that any contract which results in the 
company acquiring shares contrary to the provisions of section 85(4) is 
not enforceable against the company and places the onus of proof on the 
company. 
Section 89 permits subsidiaries to acquire up to ten percent of the 
shares in its holding company without the need to cancel them. (Section 
39 understandably provides that such shares will be excluded for voting 
purposes.) This is as close as South African law comes to allowing 
treasury shares. 122 
122 See Cassim, FHI 'The challenge of treasury shares' 2010 Acta Juridica 151 for a discussion of why 











The new section 90 was the most striking and far reaching 
development of the 1999 amendments. It abolished the rule that dividends 
could not be paid out of capital. Section 90 permits, if authorised by the 
articles, 'payments' to shareholders provided that the solvency and 
liquidity requirements contained in subsection (2) are met. A 'payment' is 
defined as any direct or indirect payment, transfer of money or other 
property to a shareholder by virtue of their shareholding, but excludes 
buy-backs, redemptions, the issue of capitalisation shares and shares 
acquired pursuant to a court order. Buy-backs are separately dealt with in 
sections 85 to 89 as outlined above. Redemptions are separately dealt with 
under section 98 and can only be out of profits or the proceeds of a fresh 
issue. Capitalisation issues are funded out of profits so their exclusion is 
understandable as is the protection of court discreti n. 
Section 90 means that a company can pay shareholders out of the 
capital fund reserved for creditors without having to formally reduce 
capital and alter its capital accounts, provided that the solvency and 
liquidity tests are met. Because the company's capital accounts are not 
affected, shareholders' rights upon winding up are not impacted. Post the 
new section 90 non-distributable reserves are therefore something of the 
past, even though section 87(5) still refers to share premium and capital 
reserve redemption fund as such. 
The new section 90 brought South Africa into line with the 
international trend away from the capital maintenance regime. 
disallowing treasury shares runs counter to the Department of Trade and Industry's stated policy goal 












6.2 Anomalies remain - a hybrid approach 
Cassim and Cassim capture the position under the existing companies act 
succinctly as follows. '[t]he South African Companies Act 61 of 1973 
adopts a strange and curious ambivalence toward the nineteenth-century 
common law concept of the maintenance of the share capital of a 
company. In some respects, the Companies Act still clings to this archaic 
and outdated concept, while in other respects, it boldly sweeps away the 
concepts and replaces it with the more modern twin tests of "liquidity" 
and "solvency" as a form of creditor protection. 123 
It is indeed odd that a dated provision like section 79 prohibiting the 
payment of interest on share capital should survive alongside a 
progressive provision such as section 90 that in any event permits 
payments in nature such as those that section 79 is aimed at preventing. 
It is also a mystery why buy-backs under section 85 and payments 
under section 90 are subject to solvency and liquidity requirements, while 
in respect of redemptions, which are also distributions in substance, the 
old fashioned concept of profits available for dividends remains as a 
funding option (along with the proceeds of a fresh issue) and no regard is 
to be had to solvency and liquidity. The retention of par value shares and 
the stated capital concept also seem out of place under a solvency and 
liquidity dispensation. 
When the amendment act was passed, section 38 was altered to permit 
a company or its subsidiary to provide financial assistance for the 
purchase of its own shares only in connection with a buy-back under 
section 85. Some view the section 38 prohibition against the provision by 
a company of financial assistance for the purpose of or in connection with 
123 Cassim, FHI and Cassim, R 'The capital maintenance concept and share repurchases in South 












the acquisition of its own shares as a mere extension of the rule to protect 
creditors that a company may not purchase its own shares, and therefore 
simply regard the fact that section 38 was not amended to include 
solvency and liquidity criteria as an oversight on the part of the 
legislature. It has been noted however that the aim of the section 38 
prohibition is to achieve more than just the protection of creditors. A 
potentially devastating abuse that section 38 is aimed at is the use of 
company funds for improper purposes, such as employing the company's 
resources to fund a leveraged buy-out i.e. assets- stripping; or to thwart a 
takeover bid. 124 Cassim is of the view that section 38 plays a crucial role 
in our company law and that reform of the provision as in the United 
States, where only solvency and liquidity requirements need be met, is not 
adequate to protect minority shareholders from directors misusing 
company resources. 125 This view is shared by the authors of Hahlo's 
South African Company Law through the Cases who see a continued need 
for the section 38 prohibition. 126 Whether or not the legislature took 
cognisance of this when it showed restraint in the 1999 amendments is 
open to debate, but by 2006 the tide had turned and section 9 of the 
Corporate Laws Amendment Act No. 24 of 2006 amended section 38 to 
permit financial assistance provided that solvency and liquidity 
requirements (now contained in section 38(2A)) are met and that the terms 
of the assistance are sanctioned by special resolution. Minority 
shareholders thus remain vulnerable. 
Section 90 has also been subject to criticism. Notable shortcoming are 
that it does not clearly state when the tests are to be satisfied, i.e. when the 
payment is first contemplated or when it is actually made; it does not offer 
any guidance as to for how long after a payment a company must remain 
solvent and liquid, the incurring of a debt is not expressly included in the 
definition of payment, 127 it does not address director liability for offending 
124 Cassim, FHI 'The Reform of Company Law and the Capital Maintenance Concept' at 29l. 
125 Ibid. 
126 At 125. 











payments and a special resolution is not required as would be the case for 
buy backs under section 85. Furthennore, while shareholders are liable to 
the company for any amount received in contravention of the solvency 
and liquidity requirements contained in section 90(2), creditors do not 
have right to challenge a payment in court as they do under section 85. 
But perhaps the most pointed criticism of section 90 (and in fact section 
85 too) is that its solvency and liquidity tests do not factor in the rights of 
preference shareholders. In other words because obligations to preference 
shareholder are not necessarily treated as liabilities for the purposes of the 
tests, a company can legally pay away all of its net assets to ordinary 
shareholders, without having regard to the claims of preference share 
holders, thereby seriously undennining the value of their shares. 128 











7 A NEW DISPENSATION 
7.1 The new legislative framework 
The extensive process of corporate law refonn in South Africa has been 
completed and the new companies Act will come into effect in the near 
future. Attention will now be given to the approach adopted under the new 
Act. The new approach will be analysed in two stages. Firstly, the role of 
solvency and liquidity will be dealt with. Thereafter the case for 
broadening the scope of protection offered through means of 
interpretation of the new Act and way in which it interfaces with the 
Constitution will be examined. Comment will then be made regarding the 
potential consequences for the development of company law in South 
Africa. 
7.2 The new companies act and solvency and liquidity 
The new companies Act builds on and overhauls the solvency and 
liquidity concept that was introduced into the existing Act by the 
Companies Amendment Act No. 37 of 1999 in a clear and consistent 
manner. In as much as it afforded the benefit of working with a blank 
canvass, the drafting ofthe new act presented the legislature with a fresh 
opportunity of thoughtfully and proactively fonnulating a new framework 
in line with modem thinking, as opposed to the reactionary means of 
continual amendment followed over the course of the past thirty-odd 
years. 129 The legislature has made good use of this opportunity. 
Foundationally, the new Act retains the concept of authorised share 
capital as a protection mechanism for shareholders against dilution. 130 It 
does away with par value shares, however, (subject to transitional 
129 Department of Trade and Industry, South African company law for the 21 st century: guidelines for 
corporate law reform GG 26493 of 23 June 2004 at para 2.1. 











provisions), making no par value shares compulsoryl3l and does not 
regulate the way in which subscription proceeds are accounted for i.e. a 
stated capital account is not required. This makes perfect sense from a 
creditor's perspective in a dispensation driven by solvency and liquidity, 
but shareholders are now no longer afforded blanket protection against 
disparate treatment and will have to look to other means to ensure equality 
of treatment such as the instruction to directors in section 37(1), pre-
emptive rights and the shareholders' appraisal remedy. 
The existing act was originally drafted to give expression to the capital 
maintenance concept and the process of patching it to accommodate a 
solvency and liquidity approach has resulted in different rules for 
regulating what in substance amounts to the same fundamental action, 
being a distribution to shareholders. \32 The existing act does not contain a 
definition of 'distribution' which hampers it in adopting a unifonn 
approach. This is remedied under the new act. A definition of 
'distribution' is contained in section 1 and any distribution is now subject 
to the solvency and liquidity tests which are centrally contained in section 
4, as opposed to being scattered throughout. This is a marked 
improvement on the existing act which houses the solvency and liquidity 
tests in section 38(2A) for financial assistance, in section 85(4) for buy-
backs, section 90(2) for payments. 
The solvency and liquidity tests contained in section 4(1)(a) and 4(lb) 
respectively. The section requires a consideration of all reasonably 
foreseeable financial circumstances of the company in respect of both 
tests. Van der Linde makes the point that while necessary in the context of 
the liquidity test which necessitates prediction as a matter of course, this 
requirement is not suitable to the solvency test which is referenced to a 
131 Section 35(2). 
132 Van Der Linde, K . Regulation of distributions to shareholders in the Companies Act 2008' 2009 











specific point in time. 133 The solvency test contains some awkward 
language requiring consideration of the group perspective as opposed to 
the company itself and again Vander Linde expresses doubt as to the need 
for this complication and asks why, if relevant, this requirement is only 
applied to the solvency test and not the liquidity test. 134 The liquidity test 
requires a twelve month forecast in line with JSE Securities Exchange 
listing requirements. 135 For both tests the new Act is more prescriptive 
than the existing Act, financial information is required to be based on 
financial reporting standards, with assets and liabilities included at fair 
valuation. Unless the memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise 
the preferential rights of preference shareholders must be taken into 
account when applying the tests. Section 4 includes timing rules that 
govern the timing of the application of the test to different types of 
transactions and provides welcome clarity. 
Under the exiting Act different distribution had different impacts on 
the company's capital accounts, but the new Act does not regulate the 
impact of distributions on the company's capital accounts and does not 
require the creation of non-distributable reserves. 136 It is also pleasing to 
see that the solvency and liquidity tests are uniformly applied to all forms 
of distribution, unlike the existing act in which redemptions and the 
payment of interest on share capital are handled as exceptions to the 
capital maintenance rule. 
'Distribution' is widely defined in section 1 as a direct or indirect (a) 
transfer of money or other property from a company to any shareholder of 
the company or a group company whether, (i) in the form of a dividend, 
(ii) as a payment in lieu of capitalisation shares, (iii) as consideration for 
the acquisition by the company of it own shares or for the acquisition of 
133 Van Der Linde, K 'The solvency and liquidity approach in the Companies Act 2008' 2009 Journal 
of South African Law 224 at 227. 
134 Ibid at 228. 
l35 There are some nuances here. It is not quite this simple. See note Van der Linde ibid for more detail. 











any other group company's shares by a group company, or (iv) otherwise 
in respect of any of the shares of a company or a group company, other 
than pursuant to a dissenting shareholders appraisal remedy; (b) 
incurrence of a debt or obligation by the company for the benefit of a 
shareholder of the company or a group company; and (c) forgiveness or 
waiver by the company of a debt owed to the company by a shareholder of 
the company or a group company. This definition draws heavily on the 
best United States and Canadian comparable legislation and is 
commendably comprehensive, but over-emphasises the group context 
when 'indirecf arguably already covers this aspect. Van der Linde 
explains that this over-articulation may lead to absurd consequences in 
that the downward application of the definition within a group context 
foreseeable even covers corporate actions in which the basic element of 
gratuity is absent. 137 
Section 46 applies the section 4 tests to all types of distributions. 
Furthermore, section 46 requires all distributions to be authorised by the 
board of directors, except those pursuant to existing obligations or a court 
order, and the board must by resolution acknowledge that the company 
will meet the section 4 tests immediately after completing the proposed 
distribution. What is more, if the distribution is not carried out within 120 
business days from the formal acknowledgment, a fresh board resolution 
must be adopted before the company can carry out the distribution. This 
clarity on the application of the test is most welcome. Directors liability 
for those failing to vote against a distribution which they knew was in 
contravention of the section is contained in subsection 6. This remedies 
the existing loophole for directors under section 90 of the existing Act 
which does not address the consequences of a contravention. 











Section 48 imposes additional safeguard requirements on buybacks 
over and above the section 46 requirements, given the potential negative 
impact of this corporate action on shareholders. 
Section 44 deals with the provision of financial assistance by the 
company for the purpose of acquiring its shares. It applies the solvency 
and liquidity test of section 4 and requires the terms of the assistance to be 
approved by special resolution. This is similar to the position under the 
existing act, but a few additional safeguards have been built in. The 
approving special resolution must designate a specific recipient or a 
particular category of potential recipient and one only hopes that these 
additional disclosure requirements will assist in preventing the abuse of 
power. The board of directors must also be satisfied that the proposed 
terms are fair and reasonable to the company. While this will be of benefit 
to creditors, it is doubtful whether this additional requirement is 
substantively beneficial to minority shareholders. It is the company the 
terms must be 'fair and reasonable' to and not a shareholder who does not 
receive such assistance. 
It is anticipated that there will be some teething problems with the new 
Act and indeed certain inconsistencies have already been noted. 138 
Presumably these will be remedied before the new Act becomes 
operational and will soon be left in the past. 
This then is how creditors" interests (among others) are catered for 
under the solvency and liquidity framework of the new Act to ensure the 
continued viability of the company as an economic unit. But can others, 
including creditors, find any additional protection under the new Act? 
138 Refer note 1. Also see Van der Linde supra (notes 130 and 131) for detailed analysis of distributions 











7.3 Creditors as stakeholders 
The shareholder v stakeholder debate has been continuing, if at times 
somewhat in the background, ever since the Berle-Means seminal work, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, sparked discussion 
around the issue in the United States in the 1930'S.139 It has gained 
prominence in recent years with many spectacular corporate failures 
bringing corporate governance under the microscope. 
One the one side there are the advocates of shareholders primacy: they 
claim that it is solely the interest of shareholders that should concern 
management and that accordingly the only goal of management should be 
to maximise shareholder wealth. This is the classical Anglo-American 
position and was famously encapsulated by Friedman when he stated that 
the only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits while 
remaining within the rules of the game. Friedman went so far as to label 
any alternative view as "fundamentally subversive doctrine". 140 
On the other side are those whose insist that the as a separate legal 
entity the interest of the company cannot simply be those of its 
shareholders, but that in terms of the implicit social contract that company 
operate under, other groups interests are also worthy of consideration and 
protection, and management has a obligation to consider them. Parkinson 
points out that this view is not necessarily dependent upon any specific 
formulation of the essence and purpose of the corporate from but is 
instead based upon a political theory about the conditions under which 
power, and more specifically corporate power, may be legitimately held 
and exercised. The nub of such a thesis is that a concentration of power 
139 In May 1932 Merrick Dodd published the article detailed in note 17 in response to the view of 
Berle. 
140 Friedman, M 'The social responsibility ofa business is to increase its profits' The New York Times 











may only be tolerated if it furthers the public goOd. 141 Employees' 
interests are usually singled out as being particularly deserving of 
consideration. 
Adherents to the stakeholder formulation can further be divided into 
two groups. Firstly there are those that believe that the interest of 
stakeholders are deserving of attention, but that such interests cannot be 
pursued as ends in themselves but rather only in so far as they also further 
the interests of shareholders. This is called the enlightened shareholder 
value approach. Then, at the extreme, there are those that follow what is 
referred to a pluralist approach. Pluralists believe that stakeholder interests 
are worthy of pursuit in their own right, even if such interests conflict 
with the interests of shareholders. 
In the Canadian case of Teck Corporation v Miller, 142 referring to the 
interests of employees, the court held that although it would be improper 
for directors to entirely disregard to the interests of shareholders, they 
could not be found to be in breach of their fiduciary duties in they 
considered the interest of other stakeholders. This remains the leading 
case in the consideration of stakeholder interests in Canada and is in line 
with the enlightened shareholder value approach. In the United States too 
there have decisions in this vein and some states have implemented 
constituency statues to oblige directors to consider interests other than 
those of stakeholders. 143 
The United Kingdom followed the enlightened shareholder value 
approach in its extensive review of company law and chose to include a 
provision in the statutory listing of directors' duties requiring directors to 
141 Parkinson, JE Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (1993) at 
31. 
142 (1972) 33 DLR (3d) 288 313 - 314. 
143 Green, RM 'Shareholders as stakeholders: changing metaphors of corporate governance' (1993) 50 











have to regard other group's interests when promoting the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole. 144 
In our law directors fiduciary duties are currently only found in 
common law but the new Companies Act contains a provision on the 
standard of directors' conduct. 145 Although the Department of Trade and 
Industry favoured the enlightened shareholder value approach, it stopped 
short of attempting to list the other interests to be considered by directors 
as was done in the United Kingdom. Instead section 76(3)(b) merely 
states the familiar exhortation for directors to exercise their duties in the 
best interests ofthe company. The scope of directors' duties have 
therefore not been widened thorough any particular (re)statement of 
responsibilities. 146 It will still be for the common law to contain and 
develop the fullness ofthe meaning and implications ofthis seemingly 
simple and familiar sounding provision. 147 
In part 3.2 above creditors' interests were classified as financial both 
primary and secondary. It is now however contended that the interests of 
creditors run even deeper than this. 'Creditors' is a compendious term 
and creditors' interests are therefore diverse. Creditors' interests in the 
company extend beyond simply having an invoice settled or a debt 
satisfied and the repetition of that state of affairs. Creditors are also part of 
society and therefore have an implicit interest in the company fulfilling its 
societal obligations, if and to the extent that a company can be said to 
have societal obligations, as much as any other stakeholder does. 
144 Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006. 
145 Section 76 of the new Act. 
146 Rabkin, F 'Directors' duties and human rights' Business Day of 10 November 2008 quotes 
Cassim's position that this approach is to be preferred over one which conflates constitutional law with 
corporate law. Directors already have to take into account constitutional requirements and bill of 
rights. In contrast, Bilchitz favours a specific duty for directors to realise fundamental human rights. 











While the interests of creditors are traditionally viewed only in the 
narrow primary financial sense, and to a limited extent in the secondary 
financial sense,148 it is worthwhile bearing firmly in mind that because 
creditors are not an homogenous group and not easily classified, they may 
well be viewed as having further interests in the company more in line 
with those of other stakeholders. 
7.4 The new companies act and matters of interpretation 
Section 5 ofthe Act is entitled 'general Interpretation' and subsection (1) 
requires that the new Act be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives 
effect to the purposes set out in section 7. Section 7 in entitled 'purposes 
of the Act' and sets out a comprehensive list ofthe intention ofthe 
legislature in promulgating the new Act. Certain of these stated purposes 
are noteworthy in so far as they potentially widen the scope of directors' 
fiduciary duties and open the door for the consideration of interests other 
than those of shareholders: 
• Section 7(a) states that a purpose of the Act is to promote 
compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in the 
Constitution, in the application of company law; 
• section 7(b)(iii) states that a purpose of the Act is to develop the 
South African economy by encouraging high standards of 
governance in light of' ... the significant role of enterprises within 
the social and economic life of the nation[.]' , and 
• section 7(d) states that a purpose of the Act is to reaffirm the 
concept of the company as a means of achieving economic and 
social benefits. 
It is thus the stated purpose of the new Act that its company law should 
to promote compliance with human rights. The new Act specifically 
acknowledges that companies have a significant role to play in the social 











life of the Republic and the attainment of social benefits. Let us now 
consider the matter of enforcement. 
Section 157 is entitled 'extended standing to apply for remedies' and 
provides that the right to make application to a regulatory institution may 
be exercised by persons, among others, acting as a member of or in the 
interest of a group or class of affected persons (subsection (l)(c)) or acting 
in the public interest, with the leave of the court (subsection (l)(d)). 
Subsection (3)(a) clarifies that this right is limited to those persons 
contemplated in section 165(2). Section 165 (2) lists among those persons 
permitted to take action to protect the legal interests ofthe company, 
registered trade unions or other employee representatives (subsection (c)), 
as well as persons who have been granted leave of the court to protect 
their legal rights (subsection (c). The result of these provisions is that 
stakeholders may now be afforded a justicable right of action, or at very 
least the consideration of a right to action, that is not available under the 
existing act. 149 But the new Act does not stop there. 
Section 158 is entitled 'remedies to promote the purpose of act (sic)': 
• section 158(a) requires a court to develop the common law as 
necessary to improve the realization and enjoyment of rights 
established by the Act; and 
• section 158(b) further requires, among others, a court to promote 
the spirit, purpose and objects of the Act and where multiple 
meanings are possible to prefer any interpretation that best 
promotes the spirit, purpose and objects of the Act. 
149 Coetzee, L 'A comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 and the Companies Act 71 of2008' 2010 Acta Juridica 290 at 298. Coetzee notes that 
because the new act does not define 'legal interest' or specify the causes of action for which a 











Here we find the aspirationallanguage ofthe constitution being echoed 
to enjoin the judiciary to adopt of purposive approach to interpretation of 
company law that necessarily requires the making of value judgments in 
light of public policy. Sealy states that -... it is rare for a judge in a 
company law case to make any reference to the policy implications of the 
ruling he is giving, or even to acknowledge an awareness that that his 
decision may be helping to shape policy for the future.' 150This can clearly 
no longer be true in the South African context. 
7.5 The impact of the constitution 
The Republic of South Africa has a supreme constitution that is rated 
amongst the most progressive in the world, with a ground breaking Bill of 
Rights. Section 8 of the Constitution deals with the application of the Bill 
of Rights. Section 8(1) is interpreted to provide for the vertical application 
of the Bill of Rights i.e. between individuals and the state, with section 
8(2) making it clear that the Bill of Rights also has horizontal application 
i.e. between private individuals. Section (3) requires courts to develop the 
common law to give effect to the Bill of Rights and section 8(4) 
specifically provides that the Bill of Rights applies to juristic persons. 
Not only does all law in South Africa derive its power from the 
constitution, but structures that are in conflict with the Constitution are 
not valid. 151 The classical Anglo-American conception of the company as 
a structure to maximise profits for shareholders to the exclusion of all 
other rights and interests is therefore no longer tenable under South 
African law. There is a fundamental difference in the regulatory 
environment between South Africa and the United Kingdom and United 
States. 152 The very nature ofthe company under South African law has 
150 Sealy supra (note 38) at 185. 
151 Bilchitz, D 'Corporate law and the constitution: towards binding human rights responsibilities for 
corporations' (2008) 125 SAil 754 at 781. 
152 Mongalo, T -Corporate governance and the constitution: a case for broadening the stakeholders' in 












therefore been altered and has moved away from its Anglo- American 
origins. 153 The impact of this cannot be over stressed. 
There is also a constitutional imperative of interpretation set out in 
section 39(2) of the Constitution to ' ... promote the spirit, purport and the 
object of the Bill of Rights' . Mongalo makes the point in relation to the 
impact of the constitution in interpreting what constitutes the best interests 
of the company. 154 He urges courts to be bold in applying constitutional 
principles and to reflect upon whether the generally accepted and long 
held interpretations as expressed through the common law remain valid in 
the post-constitutional environment. 
What is most important for us now is the Constitution and not the 
traditional common law position. Davis et al make the point that in the 
context of a global neo-liberal agenda in which social rights and 
entitlements are under attack, it is necessary to ' ... develop a 
transformative constitutional discourse that advances the interests 
associated with social citizenship.' ISS The authors call for a 
'transformative constitutional jurisprudence' 156 in light of South Africa's 
vast and far reaching constitutional transformation and with 
disappointment note a judicial unwillingness to embrace broad 
interpretations of social rights. 
There can no longer be sheltering in technical legal arguments as under 
the formalism of the apartheid legal culture. 157 It must be recognised that 
the core values of the constitution are in contrast to the pre-constitutional 
153 Bilchitz supra at 780-81. 
154 Mongalo op cit at 178 - 79. 
155 Davis et al 'Social Rights, Social Citizenship and Transformative Constitutionalism: A Comparative 
Assessment' in Conaghan, J et al (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Glob ali sat ion: Transformative 
Practices and Possibilities 511 at 511. 
156 Ibid at 513. 
157 Bilchitz, D 'David Bilchitz: What is reasonable to the court is unfair to the poor' in Business Day of 












dispensation and status quO. IS8 Courts are required to engage in 
substantive reasoning in the light of public policy and can no longer hold 
to legal fonnalism. 
7.6 Has the position regarding the protection of creditors interests 
changed? 
The traditional Anglo-American approach to the best interests of the 
company cannot continue as the dominant view in South Africa given the 
fundamental shift brought about by our Constitution. The position 
regarding the protection of all stakeholder interests has changed and 
therefore by default the position regarding the protection of creditors' 
interests has changed. Stakeholder interests now have independent value 
separate and distinct from the interest of shareholders and stakeholders 
have been given standing to uphold their new rights. 
It is often said that a duty to everyone is a duty to no one. Without 
clear guidance as to what trade-offs between competing interests are both 
desirable and pennissible, management are left to their own initiative in 
choosing and pursuing corporate goals. Jensen puts this sentiment into 
economic terms effectively saying that if the corporate objective cannot be 
expressed as a rational objective function then efficiency can never be 
achieved. ls9 Management becomes its own master. It is interesting to note 
that when Dodd contended in his famous 1932 article that companies 
should to be managed in a socially responsible manner, it was with a full 
understanding that the implication of companies being required to 
embrace interests beyond those of shareholders would lead to confusion 
within the ranks of management. 160 His defence was that' [T]he question 
with which this article is concerned is not whether voluntary acceptance 
158 Venter, F 'Politics, socio-economic issues and culture in constitutional adjudication' (2003) 6 
Potchefstoom Electronic Law Journal xiii at xix. 
159 Jensen, Me 'Value maximisation, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function' (2002) 
12 Business Ethics Quarterly 235. 











of social responsibility by corporate managers is workable, but whether 
experiments in that direction run counter to fundamental principles of the 
law of business corporations.' In other words Dodd neatly sidestepped the 
issue of how competing stakeholder interests should be dealt with. 
Courts in South Africa are not going to have the luxury of passing the 
buck but are going to have to roll up their sleeves and set about creating a 
framework within which to measure and manage competing stakeholder 
interests. Either that, or the legislature is going to have to give further 
guidance to the courts on how to proceed; but it is unlikely that the 
legislature is going to be drawn on the matter. 161 The legislature has made 
the bullets but the courts are going to have to fire them; and the bullets 
may be more closely likened to a bombshell. 
It is also interesting to note that while one of the objectives of the 
process of company law reform was to facilitate compatibility and 
harmony with international best practice jurisdictions, 162 the overarching 
effect of our juggernaut Constitution will have implications that run 
counter to international compatibility. 
It remains to be seen how the international business community will 
respond to these ground breaking developments in South African 
company law. Although the legislature was conscious not to' ... create an 
uneven playing field to the detriment of South African companies ... ', 163 it 
may nevertheless have done so in underestimating the transformative 
power of the Constitution. 
161 Rabkin, F supra (note 144) quoting Mongalo. 
162 Department of Trade and Industry, South African company Law for the 21 51 century: guidelines for 
corporate law reform GG 26493 of23 June 2004at para 1.2. 












Even if one views the purpose of company law as being to regulate directors' 
powers in the best interests of the company, imposing a duty of trust on directors 
in favour of creditors is inconsistent with the real need for directors to assume 
calculated risks in the normal course of business and is therefore not tenable. 
This along with further considerations such as the widely diverse interests of 
creditors, makes the expansion of directors' duties to include a duty to creditors 
a dead end as a means of creditor protection. Although the courts have 
established an ethereal obligation for directors to consider the interests of 
creditors, their efforts are seriously hampered in instances where the company is 
not insolvent, and indeed even establishing a framework for determining de facto 
insolvency has in itself been problematic. The exact content of the 'duty' is 
elusive and even if established, creditors do not traditionally have standing to 
enforce a remedy. Reactionary insolvency law type provisions are of limited 
proactive use to creditors and are tantamount to closing the stable door after the 
horse has bolted. Instead, alternative means have had to be sought to proactively 
safeguard the economic viability of the company as a building block of the 
economy, and thereby indirectly address the varied interests of creditors in all 
their fullness. 
The system of legal capital and capital maintenance is a legacy of nineteenth 
century English jurisprudence. As a scheme it has two driving considerations. 
On the one hand is the protection of creditor's interest and on the other is the 
regulation of the relationship between shareholders to achieve equity. This paper 
has focused on the ability of the legal capital system to address the former 
consideration as a potential answer to the broader interest of creditors. It was 
found that capital maintenance is in itself inadequate as measure to achieve the 
protection of creditors' interests because it is founded on a static and over-
simplified view of the company; and it does not address key concerns of 











Internationally the use of solvency and liquidity tests as a means of protecting 
the interest of creditors by limiting distributions to shareholders has found 
favour over the past three decades, first in the United States and then in 
commonwealth jurisdictions. Solvency and liquidity regimes however are not 
without their own challenges and the European Union is hesitant to move away 
from its legal capital system, until there is empirical evidence as to the 
superiority of one system over the other. Given that solvency and liquidity 
regimes are still, in relative terms, in their infancy, this approach is not entirely 
without merit. 
South Africa began moving toward a solvency and liquidity regime in 1999 
and although the exiting companies Act presents a hybrid approach, being an 
enigmatic confluence of the old capital maintenance regime and new solvency 
and liquidity dispensation, the new Companies Act moves boldly into the clear 
realm of solvency and liquidity as the sole determinative factor limiting 
distributions to shareholders. 
The new Act is not only sympathetic to the interest of stakeholders other than 
shareholders, it goes so far as to give standing to such stakeholders to call the 
management of companies (and by implication its shareholders) to account and 
apply to court for remedies. Because no piece oflegislation operates in a 
vacuum, an analysis of the constitutional framework in which the new Act will 
operate was required to fully understand to understand the functioning of the 
new Act in the context of the socio-economic rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution. 
When considering the effect of the new Companies Act and the Constitution in 
tandem, it seems that the interests of creditors are advanced beyond the 
economic sustainability achieved, in so far as is possible, by comprehensive 
solvency and liquidity requirements, in enhanced ways that are yet to become 
fully apparent. The new act interacts with the Constitution to elevate the interests 











before achieved in company law anywhere else in the world. In theory, this puts 
South Africa in a unique global position. What remains to be seen is if the courts 
will be willing to depart from traditional legal formalism and embrace the radical 
transformation demanded of this new order. The new order is not without the 
significant challenge of having to determine the permissible and desirable trade-
offs between competing stakeholder interests, and it is hoped that in the final 
analysis this does not prove to be an obstacle of such immense proportion that it 














Aveling Bar/ord v Perion Ltd [1989] 5 B.C.C 677 
Burnes v Pennell 2 H. L. Cas497 (1849) 
Capitex Bank v Qorus Holdings Limited & others [2003] JOL 12125 (W) 
Cohen v Segal 1970 (3) SA 702 (W) 
Jenkins v Harbour View Courts Ltd [1966] NZLR 1 
Lewis v Oneanate (Pty) Ltd 1992 (4) SA 811 (A) 818 
Ooregum Gold Mining Company o/India v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL) 
Re Halt Garage [1982] 3 All E.R. 1016 
Redweaver Investments Ltd v Lawrence Field Ltd (1991) 5 ACSR 438 SC(NSW) 
Ridge Securities Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1964] 1 W.L.R. 479 
Rosslare (Pty) Ltd and Another v Registrar o/Companies [1972] 2 All SA 354 
(D) 
Sage Holdings v Unisec Group Limited & others 1982 (1) SA 337 
Teck Corp v Miller (1972) 33 DLR (3d) 288 
Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409; [1886-90J All ER Rep 4650 (HL) 
Verner v General and Commercial Investment Trust [1894] 2 Ch 239264 (CA) 
Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 C.L.R. 1 (H. Ct.) 
Wood v Drummer (C.C.D. Me. 1824) Fed. Cas, No. 17944 
South African Statutes 
Companies Act 31 of 1973. 
Companies Act 71 of2008. 
Secondary Sources 
Aguirre, D 'Corporate social responsibility and human rights law in Africa' 
(2005) 5 African Hum Rights Law Journal 239. 
Aiken, M and Ardern, D . An accounting history of capital maintenance: legal 
precedents for managerial autonomy in the United Kingdom' (2005) 32 The 
Accounting Historians Journal 23. 
Armour, J 'Share capital and creditor protection: efficient rules for a modem 











Ballantine, HW and Hills, GS 'Corporate capital and restrictions upon dividends 
under modern corporation laws' (1934-1935) 23 Californian Law Review 229. 
Bainbridge, SM 'In defense of the shareholders wealth maximization norm: a 
reply to Professor Green' (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1423. 
Bickenbach, JE 'Law and morality' (1989) 8 Law Philosophy 291. 
Bilchitz, D 'Corporate law and the constitution: towards binding human rights 
responsibilities for corporations' (2008) 125 SAL! 754. 
Blackman, M 'Directors' duty to exercise their powers for an authorised 
business purpose' (1990) 2 South African Mercantile Law Journal 1. 
Blackman, M et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) Juta, Cape Town. 
Cassim, FHI 'The challenge oftreasury shares' 2010 Acta Juridica 151. 
Cassim, FHI 'The new statutory provisions on company share repurchases: a 
critical analysis' (1999) 116 SAL! 760. 
Cassim, FHI 'The reform of company law and the capital maintenance concept' 
(2005) 122 SAL! 283. 
Cassim, FHI 'The repurchase by a company of its own shares: the concept of 
treasury shares' (2003) 120 SAL! 137. 
Cassim, FHI and Cassim, R 'The capital maintenance concept and share 
repurchases in South African law' 8 October 2004. Available at 
http://www.bowman.co.za/Law Articles/Law-Article~id~-639353216.asp 
[accessed 17 August 2010]. 
Cilliers and Benade et al Corporate Law 3ed (2000) LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Durban. 
Coetzee, L 'A comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings 
under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and the Companies Act 71 of 2008' 2010 
Acta Juridica 290. 
Davis, DM et al 'Social rights, social citizenship and transformative 
constitutionalism: a comparative assessment' in Conaghan, J et al (eds) Labour 
law in an era of globalisation: transformative practices and possibilities 2002 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Department of Trade and Industry, The Companies Bill 2007: notice of intention 
to introduce bill into parliament: explanatory summary of bill GG 29630 of 12 
February 2007. 
Department of Trade and Industry, South African company Law for the 21 st 











Dodd, EM 'For whom are corporate managers trustees?' (1932) 45 Harvard Law 
Review 1145. 
Doran, NJL 'Transactions at an undervalue and the maintenance of capital 
principle' (1991) 12 Company Lawyer 169. 
Enriques, L and Macey, JR 'Creditors versus capital formation: the case against 
the European legal capital rules' (2000-2001) 86 Cornell Law Review 1165. 
Ferran, E 'Creditors' interests and core company law' (1999) 20 Company 
Lawyer 314. 
Ferran, E Principles of Corporate Finance Law (2008) Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Friedman, M 'The social responsibility of a business is to increase its profits' 
The New York Times Magazine of 13 September 1970. 
Grantham, R 'The judicial extension of directors' duties to creditors' 1991 
Journal of Business Law 1. 
Gray, WD 'Peoples v. Wise and Dylex: indentifying stakeholder interests upon 
or near corporate insolvency - stasis or pragmatism?' (2003) 39 Canadian 
Business Law Journal 242. 
Green, CH 'The purpose of a company is .... ' Trust Matters, Trusted Advisor 
Associates LLC internet article posted on 1 March 2010. Available at 
http://trustedadvisor .com/trustmatters/7 53/The-Purpose-of-a-Company-Is 
[accessed on 17 August 2010]. 
Green, RM 'Shareholders as stakeholders: changing metaphors of corporate 
governance' (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1409. 
Hanks, 11 'The new legal capital regime in South Africa' 2010 Acta Juridica 
131. 
Havenga, M 'Directors' fiduciary duties under our future company-law regime' 
(1997) 9 South African Mer.cantile Law Journal 310. 
Jensen, MC 'Value maximisation, stakeholder theory, and the corporate 
objective function' (2002) 12 Business Ethics Quarterly 235. 
Jooste, R 'Can share capital be reduced other than by way of a buyback?' (2005) 
122 SALJ294. 
Keay, A 'Tackling the issue ofthe corporate objective: an analysis of the United 
Kingdom's "Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach'" (2007) 29 Sydney Law 
Review 577. 












Kuhner, C 'The future of creditor protection through capital maintenance rules in 
European law' (2006) ECFR Special Volume 1 Legal Capital in Europe 341. 
Levy, IJ -Purchase by an English company of its own shares' (1930) 79 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 45. 
Manning, B with Hanks Jr, JJ Legal Capital3ed (1990) The Foundation Press 
Inc., New York. 
Macintosh, NB et al 'Accounting as simulacrum and hyperreality: perspectives 
on income and capital' (2000) 25 Accounting, Organisations and Society 13. 
McKenzie-Skene, DW 'Directors' duty to creditors of a financially distressed 
company: a perspective from across the pond' (2006-2007) 1 Journal of 
Business and Technology Law 499. 
Millon, D 'Theories ofthe corporation' (1990) 2 Duke Law Journal 201. 
Mitchell, LE 'Groundwork of the metaphysics of corporate law' (1993) 50 
Washington and Lee Law Review 1477. 
Mohamed, FJ 'Peoples v. Wise - conflating directors' duties, oppression, and 
stakeholder protection' (2006) 39 University of British Columbia Law Review 
209. 
Mongalo, T 'Corporate governance and the constitution: a case for broadening 
the stakeholders' in Du Plessis, M (ed) Constitutional Democracy in South 
Africa 1994 - 2004 (2004) Butterworths LexisNexis, Durban) 169 - 180. 
Mongalo, T Corporate law and corporate governance (2003) Van Schaik 
Publishers, Gauteng. 
Norton, JJ 'Relationship of shareholders to corporate creditors upon dissolution: 
nature and implications of the "trust fund" doctrine of corporate assets' (1974-
1975) 30 Business Law 1061. 
Parkinson, JE Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law (1993) Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Pretorius, JT et al Hahlo 's South African company law through the cases 6ed 
(1999) Juta, Cape Town. 
Sappideen, R 'Fiduciary obligations to corporate creditors' 1991 Journal of 
Business Law 365. 
Schane, SA 'The corporation is a person: the language of a legal fiction' (1986-
1987) 61 Tulane Law Review 563. 
Sealy, LS and Worthington, S Cases and Material in Company Law (2008) 











Sealy, LS 'Directors' "wider" responsibilities ~ problems conceptual, practical 
and procedural' (1987) 13 Monash University Law Review 164. 
VanDer Linde, K 'Aspects of the regulation of share capital and distributions to 
shareholders' (2008) Unpublished LLD Thesis, Unisa. 
Van Der Linde, K 'Regulation of distributions to shareholders in the Companies 
Act 2008' 2009 Journal of South African Law 484. 
Van Der Linde, K 'Regulation of share capital and shareholder contributions in 
the Companies Act 2008' 2009 Journal of South African Law 39. 
Van Der Linde, K 'Share repurchases and the protection of shareholders' 2010 
Journal of South African Law 288. 
Van Der Linde, K 'The solvency and liquidity approach in the Companies Act 
2008' 2009 Journal of South African Law 224. 
Venter, F 'Politics, socio-economic issues and culture in constitutional 
adjudication' (2003) 6 Potchefstoom Electronic Law Journal xiii. 
Weiner, JL 'Theory of Anglo-American dividend law: the English cases' (1928) 
28 Columbia Law Review 1046. 
Weiner, JL 'Theory of Anglo-American dividend law: The American statutes 
and cases' (1929) 29 Columbia Law Review 461. 
Ziegel, JS 'Creditors as corporate stakeholders: the quiet revolution ~ an Anglo-
Canadian perspective' (1993) 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 511. 
Ziegel, JS 'Is incorporation (with limited liability) too easily available' (1990) 
31 Les Cahiers de Droit 1075. 
73 
